Overview:
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Located within the Department of Energy (DOE), the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) is responsible for overseeing worker safety and security matters at nuclear weapons facilities located across the country. HSS has been the subject of much controversy since its very beginning when DOE leaders decided to eliminate the previous office handling worker safety—the Office of Environment, Safety and Health—and turn those duties over to the newly formed HSS, which is led by a longtime security chief. Critics contended the move was in deference to protecting large private contractors at the expense of workers’ safety. Complaints of safety violations at nuclear weapons sites have continued to arise despite HSS’s commitment to protect workers.
History:
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During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States entrusted the production of its nuclear weapons to the federal department in charge of energy policy. First it was the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, then briefly the Energy Research and Development Administration and finally the Department of Energy (DOE) from 1977 until the present. At its height, the nation’s nuclear weapons complex consisted of 16 major facilities and dozens of smaller ones spread out across the country that conducted research and development (R&D), produced nuclear fuel and assembled warheads.
AEC/DOE’s top priority was to build more and more weapons, including those with increasing destructive capability, as the US sought to maintain numerical superiority in the arms race against the Soviet Union. With production of weapons the overriding objective, energy officials paid less attention to safeguards protecting the environment and employees. This became abundantly clear as the Cold War came to a close and investigations were conducted into the management of defense nuclear facilities by US energy officials.
A 1994 report by the Congressional Budget Office said the DOE was faced with the disposing of 100 million gallons of highly radioactive waste spread out across the country among different facilities. The price tag for clean up was estimated at more than $100 billion. A few locations in particular—Hanford (Washington), Oak Ridge (Tennessee), Savannah River (South Carolina) and Rocky Flats (Colorado)—received considerable media coverage for serious contamination involving uranium, plutonium and various heavy metals.
Coupled with these revelations were the earlier accidents at nuclear power plants at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and Chernobyl in the Ukraine which elevated public concerns over nuclear safety. A National Research Council study in 1987 examined the conditions with nuclear reactors at Savannah River and Hanford in the wake of Chernobyl and found that DOE officials had relied almost exclusively on private contractors to identify safety concerns instead of using DOE experts, resulting in failures to adequately address technical mishaps. Another investigation by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee found that energy officials had failed to sufficiently address radiation exposure among workers at Hanford, Savannah River, Oak Ridge and Rocky Flats.
In the wake of these revelations, DOE created the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (ESH) in 1985 to provide better oversight for the dangerous work being performed at nuclear weapons facilities. In addition to making sure regulations by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) were followed, ESH conducted health studies and medical screening programs for workers and surrounding communities exposed to ionizing radiation and other hazardous materials used in DOE operations. The office also issued environmental impact statements related to agency activities.
DOE also had a poor record when it came to protecting nuclear secrets from espionage attempts. In the 1940s and early 1950s, two major espionage scandals rocked the country. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed for giving the Soviets classified documents from the Manhattan Project, the nation’s top-secret project that produced the first atom bombs. Another breach in security involved Klaus Fuchs, a German-born physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project, who gave nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union during World War II.
Although other cases of espionage would occur during the Cold War, none directly involved scientists working for the nuclear weapons complex. Then in the mid- 1990s, scandal arose again, this time involving China. An investigation by the House Select Committee on US Nuclear Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, chaired by Christopher Cox (R-CA), found that China had developed a number of key warheads based on US designs, although the committee was unable to prove that this information was acquired through espionage. This report reaffirmed suspicions by American defense and intelligence officials who had warned since the late 1970s that Chinese spies were trying to infiltrate American laboratories.
Meanwhile, the FBI began an investigation, code-named “Kindred Spirit,” of persons who had access to American nuclear warhead information. This led to the much-publicized arrest and trial of Wen Ho Lee, a computer scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 1999. The Taiwanese-born Lee had been an employee at LANL for 21 years when he was arrested by the FBI, charged with not properly securing classified materials and failing to report meetings with individuals from “sensitive” countries and held for a year. Some observers maintained that Lee was a scapegoat, and some Asian-Americans charged that his arrest was motivated by racism. At his trial in September 2000, Lee was convicted on only one of the charges against him—illegally gathering and retaining national security data. The court released him on time served and ordered him to undergo 60 hours of government debriefing.
Although the Wen Ho Lee scandal garnered a great deal of public attention, the most damaging news about the state of America’s nuclear weapons laboratories came from a report by a White House blue-ribbon panel during the Clinton presidency. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board issued “Science at its Best, Security at its Worst” in June 1999 – the first time in its 35-year history that the PFIAB had ever issued a public report. The findings were damning.
The report characterized the DOE-run nuclear weapons complex as “a large organization saturated with cynicism, an arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of denial,” adding, “no President, Energy Secretary, or Congress has been able to stem the recurrence of fundamental problems. All have been thwarted time after time by the intransigence of this institution.” The panel pointed out that DOE leaders had been presented with overwhelming evidence that their lackadaisical oversight could lead to an increase in the nuclear threat against the United States, citing scores of critical reports from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the intelligence community, independent commissions, private management consultants, the DOE Inspector General and its own security experts. The report concluded that the DOE and the weapons labs were incapable of reforming themselves—bureaucratically and culturally—thanks to a “deeply-rooted culture of low regard for and, at times, hostility to security issues, which has continually frustrated the efforts of its internal and external critics.”
A recommendation was made for the nuclear weapons labs and facilities to be placed within a new semi–autonomous agency within DOE that had a clear mission to better protect nuclear facilities from espionage. Congress and the Clinton administration liked this idea and pushed through legislation in 2000 creating the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). DOE, meanwhile, maintained its own in-house sections that were charged with overseeing security for the facilities—the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance—and ESH, responsible for worker safety. ESH duties included overseeing the work of the private contractors who had largely taken over the day-to-day operations, as well as the cleanup work at nuclear weapons labs and production centers
ESH, however, lacked “teeth” when it came to clamping down on private companies for allowing worker safety violations to occur. So in 2002 bipartisan legislation sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Jim Bunning (R-KY) was passed to give the Office of Environment, Safety and Health the authority to enforce health and safety standards against private contractors who had been hired by DOE to clean up the plants. The legislation required DOE to craft tough new regulations, but the first two attempts in 2003 and then 2005 were filled with loopholes. Finally, in early 2006, under the leadership of DOE Assistant Secretary John Shaw, who was in charge of ESH, regulations were adopted that for the first time gave energy officials the ability to fine contractors (up to $70,000 per violation) for safety failures involving toxic exposures in the workplace. In some areas, the regulations were even tougher than those required by OSHA.
But ESH never got the chance to use these new enforcement powers. First, Shaw was forced to resign, apparently in response to pushing through the tougher regulations. Then Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman announced in the summer of 2006 that ESH would be disbanded and its duties merged with the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. DOE justified the move by saying ESH had been largely ineffective in securing worker safety and that by merging it with the security office, DOE health inspectors would have more clout when investigating incidents at weapons facilities. Others, however, saw the move as a way to protect industry from the new regulations. ESH had had a reputation for slowing down work at nuclear weapons facilities when its inspectors found problems with work being performed.
Eliminating ESH sparked considerable opposition from both Democrats and Republicans. Sen. Bunning said in a statement, “I fear though that by reorganizing the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health the implementation of DOE’s new worker safety rule, which I co-sponsored with Senator Kennedy, will get lost in the shuffle and that these sick workers may not receive the attention they deserve.” Also speaking out against the move were three former DOE assistant secretaries who ran ESH during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The three former DOE officials wrote a letter (PDF) to Bodman expressing concern that eliminating the office would be “perceived outside the agency, both by DOE’s friends and its critics, as a move to downgrade the importance of ES&H issues. The Department can ill afford to fuel such a perception.”
Opposition was also voiced by the governors of New Mexico and Washington, the United Steelworkers union, the AFL-CIO’s Building and Construction Trades Department, Congressmen Bart Stupak (D-MI), Ted Strickland (D-OH) and John Dingel (D-MI), and Senators Kennedy, Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Harry Reid (D-NV) and Patty Murray (D-WA). All feared that the health and safety functions of ESH would be lost in a new office primarily concerned with security.
In spite of the protests, DOE went ahead with its plan and created a new department—the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS)—in 2006 that combined the duties of ESH and the security office. Unlike ESH, which was led by an assistant secretary who was appointed by the President, this new office was headed by a career DOE officer whose background was in security and intelligence. Some critics saw this as yet another indication of DOE’s attempt to downgrade the importance of worker safety.
Chinese Espionage against the United States (Espionage Information)
Science at its Best, Security at its Worst (Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)
Congressional Pact Alters Energy Dept. to Protect Nuclear Secrets (by Eric Schmitt, New York Times)
U.S. Will Broaden Investigation Of China Nuclear Secrets Case (by James Risen and David Johnston, New York Times)
BREACH AT LOS ALAMOS: A special report.; China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say (by James Risen and Jeff Gerth, New York Times)
DOE Swings Workplace Safety Pendulum Back (by Jordan Barab, Confined Space)
Opposition Grows To DOE's Plan To Eliminate Worker Safety Office (by Jordan Barab, Confined Space)
GAP Applauds DOE Worker Health & Safety Rule: Third Attempt Finally Institutes Reform
(Government Accountability Project)
What it Does:
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Located within the Department of Energy, the Office of Health, Safety and Security is responsible for overseeing worker safety and security matters at nuclear weapons facilities located across the country. Of the two missions, security appears to be more important. Based on the organizational structure of HSS, security operations report directly to the chief of HSS, while worker safety offices report to the deputy chief. It should also be noted that the current chief of HSS, Glenn Podonsky, ran DOE’s former security unit—the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance—before it was merged with the Office of Environment, Safety and Health to create HSS.
The primary sub-departments of HSS are as follows:
- Office of Security Operations provides physical, technical and information security for all DOE facilities in Washington, DC and the surrounding area. It maintains the DOE database for personnel security and clearance processing activities; manages the headquarters personnel security programs and the administrative review process; administers the Security Enforcement Program related to classified information violations; provides DOE executive protection services; and oversees departmental personnel security which implements the HSS drug testing program.
- Office of Health and Safety handles much what the old ESH department was responsible for, including protecting workers at nuclear weapons facilities from hazards, conducting health studies, implementing medical surveillance and screening programs for current and former workers and supporting the Department of Labor in implementation of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act.
- Office of Nuclear Safety and Environment establishes nuclear safety and environmental protection requirements related to the hazards associated with nuclear operations.
- Office of Corporate Safety Analysis examines the performance of contractor companies running nuclear weapons facilities in following safety procedures and regulations.
- Office of Enforcement implements all disciplinary actions taken against contractors and governmental personnel who violate HSS safety and security regulations.
- Office of National Training Center (NTC) is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on Kirtland Air Force Base. First established in 1984 as the Central Training Academy, the NTC trains DOE personnel and private contractors in protective force, information security, personnel security, nuclear materials control and accountability, physical protection and counterintelligence awareness. (Please see: Course Catalog (PDF), Counterintelligence Awareness Guide and True Spy Stories)
- Office of Independent Oversight provides independent assessments of HSS policies and programs to the chief of HSS and Congress. It reviews safeguards and security; cyber security; emergency management oversight; and environment, safety and health programs. The office is independent of the DOE offices that develop and implement policy and programs.
- Office of Security Policy functions as the central source within DOE for the development and analysis of safeguards and security policies and standards affecting nuclear weapons facilities, nuclear materials, personnel and classified information.
- Office of Security Technology and Assistance provides security expertise to assist HSS headquarters and field elements in planning site protection strategies. It also coordinates with domestic authorities to provide safeguards and security technical assistance, technical systems support and new technology development and deployment opportunities.
- Office of Classification is responsible for classifying and de-classifying nuclear weapons-related technology and information. It also manages DOE programs to control unclassified but sensitive information.
Energy Dept. Commandos: ‘As Good as the Military’
(by Geoff S. Fein, National Defense)
Where Does the Money Go:
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Defense contractors, private security firms and multi-national engineering and construction companies have a vested interest in HSS operations. Many of the largest companies in the US are involved with either the daily running of nuclear weapons facilities or their cleanup. For example Fluor, an international engineering and construction firm, is heavily involved in the cleanup operations at the former plutonium production facility in Hanford, Washington, one of the original Manhattan Project support sites. Hanford has been described as the most dangerous environmental project in the country, and Fluor’s work has been the subject of controversy in recent years (see Controversies). Also performing work at Hanford are construction giants Bechtel and CH2M Hill.
Wackenhut, one of the biggest private security companies in the US, also takes notice of HSS activities. While providing security guards for the Y-12 Nuclear Weapons Plant in Tennessee under a contract for the National Nuclear Security Administration, Wackenhut was dinged in a report by HSS’s predecessor, the Office of Environment, Safety and Health. The report found that Wackenhut lost 523 days of work to illness or occupational injury, placing it No. 2 out of 254 DOE contracts in largest number of “workdays lost.” In contrast, BWX Technologies, the contractor managing Y-12’s National Security Complex, reached a six-million-hour safety milestone without a lost workday injury.
Other companies, along with highly respected university systems, help operate the core facilities that today make up the nuclear weapons complex.
SEIU: Wackenhut Contract at DOE's Y-12 Nuclear Plant Lost 523 Days of Work This Year (Eye on Wackenhut)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: One of the premiere nuclear weapons labs during the Cold War, Lawrence Livermore was run by the University of California system from its beginning in 1952 until September 2007. Today, UC continues to help run the lab as part of a consortium involving Bechtel, engineering firms Babcock & Wilcox and Washington Group International, science and technology company Battelle and the Texas A&M University System.
Nevada Test Site: The Nevada Test Site is a massive outdoor laboratory (larger than the state of Rhode Island) and one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. Established by the Atomic Energy Commission to serve as the testing ground for both surface and underground nuclear blasts, the Nevada Test Site hosted more than four decades of nuclear weapons testing until the nuclear weapons testing moratorium in 1992. The site now is used for hazardous chemical spill testing, emergency response training, conventional weapons testing and waste management and environmental technology studies. As of August 2008, the site will be fully managed by National Security Technologies LLC, a joint venture involving defense contractor Northrop Grumman, construction corporation AECOM, CH2M Hill, and nuclear catchall company Nuclear Fuel Services.
Naval Reactors Facilities (Idaho) (Pittsburgh) (Schenectady): The Naval Reactors facilities are involved in the research, design, fabrication, construction, testing and operation of nuclear propulsion systems for US Navy ships and submarines. Idaho and Pittsburgh Naval Reactors are run by Bechtel-Bettis while Schenectady is run by Lockheed Martin.
Los Alamos National Laboratory: The original home of the Manhattan Project where the first atomic bombs were built, Los Alamos National Laboratory has a long history of providing key research for nuclear weapons programs. It is run by the Los Alamos National Security LLC, consisting of the University of California system, Bechtel, Babcock & Wilcox and Washington Group International.
Sandia National Laboratories: Since 1949, Sandia National Laboratories has conducted research for nuclear weapons programs and other national security-related programs. It is run by a division of Lockheed Martin Company.
Pantex: Serving as the nation’s central facility for assembling and dismantling nuclear warheads, Pantex is run by Babcock & Wilcox.
Kansas City Plant: A high-tech research production facility that historically was charged with providing many of the non-nuclear components for nuclear warheads, the Kansas City Plant is run by defense giant Honeywell.
Y-12 National Security Complex: Run by Babcock & Wilcox, Y-12 is one of the original Manhattan Project facilities that produced uranium for warheads. Today, programs at Y-12 include manufacturing, reworking and dismantling nuclear weapons components and storing special nuclear materials.
Savannah River: Once a key supplier of nuclear fuel for warheads, Savannah River still provides nuclear materials for warheads. It is run by a joint venture involving Bechtel, Babcock & Wilcox and CH2M Hill.
In addition to contractors, a wide array of public interest and anti-nuclear groups also pay close attention to the work of HSS. These include the Federation of American Scientists, Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Security.org, Center for Defense Information, Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Project on Government Oversight, Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, Snake River Alliance, Atlanta Women’s Action for New Directions, Natural Resources Defense Council and Physicians for Social Responsibility, to name just a few.
Government stakeholders include the NNSA, which has direct oversight of nuclear weapons facilities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.
Controversies:
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Security at Nuclear Weapons Sites Lagging
After the 9/11 attacks, DOE changed what it calls its “design basis threat”—how the department prepares for a potential terrorist attack against the nation’s nuclear weapons facilities. In 2003, 2005 and 2006, Energy officials kept revising the design basis threat to better prepare for attacks. By July 2006, DOE had spent more than $420 million during the previous three years in an “aggressive” attempt to toughen security by giving security officers armored vehicles and large-caliber weapons. That same year DOE promised Congress that six of its 11 nuclear weapons sites would have upgraded security by 2008.
By the fall of 2007, DOE was nowhere near meeting this deadline, according to a report by the Government Accountability Office. Five of the six sites were still far from being ready to withstand a terrorist attack as defined by the design basis threat. DOE said it had put off work because of plans to consolidate plutonium at many of the sites into centralized locations. HSS, which shares security responsibilities for the sites with the National Nuclear Security Administration, said it would continue to make enhancements at the facilities.
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-MA) blasted DOE for falling behind in its security preparations. “The department seems to think that the terrorist threat to its nuclear facilities is no more serious than a Halloween prank, as evidenced by its failure — more than six years after the 9/11 attacks — to do what it must to keep our stores of nuclear-weapons-grade materials secure,” Markey said in a statement.
Security Upgrades at Several Nuclear Sites Are Lagging, Auditors Find (by Matthew L. Wald, New York Times)
HSS Gives Embarrassing Safety Award to Fluor
In September 2006 HSS presented Fluor with a national safety award for its work at Hanford, even though the company was found guilty on numerous occasions of punishing whistle-blowers who had tried to point out safety problems at the former nuclear weapons facility.
Just one month before, a federal labor judge ordered Fluor to reinstate terminated whistleblower Richard Cecil, pay him lost salary and attorney fees and post a notice of its infraction throughout the Hanford Site. Cecil was a millwright at Hanford when he raised nuclear safety concerns associated with the removal of highly-radioactive spent reactor fuel. In July 2006 Fluor paid $415,000 as part of a settlement involving another whistleblower, electrician Maurice Rosen, who had disclosed the dumping of liquids contaminated with hexavalent chromium into the ground around H-Area of the Hanford Site.
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) was shocked to hear of HSS’s award to Fluor, given the whistle-blower incidents. GAP Nuclear Oversight Director Tom Carpenter said the award was “inappropriate and sends an alarming message to contractors: that DOE endorses, or is indifferent toward, the retaliatory behavior of its contractors.” He added, “Giving Fluor a safety award is like giving Enron one for ethics.”
DOE Award to Fluor Hanford a “Mockery (Government Accountability Project)
Radioactive Leak at Hanford Endangers Workers
Hanford was the focus of another controversy in the summer 2007 when a leak from a tank containing radioactive waste endangered a dozen workers. At least 12 workers claimed the incident made them sick, although DOE officials denied any linkage.
Workers for contractor CH2M Hill Hanford Group were pumping waste from a tank when it became blocked. Workers tried to unblock the pump by running it in reverse, resulting in 80 gallons high-level waste spilling on the ground. Jane Hedges, manager of Washington State’s Department of Ecology's Nuclear Waste Program, said a series of poor decisions put workers in grave danger from exposure to the tank waste and vapors. “This accident calls into question the adequacy of the safety culture which is so critical at the tank farms.”
HSS is responsible for making sure worker safety regulations are enforced at Hanford. Both DOE and CH2M Hill waited seven hours before announcing a radiation spill had occurred.
The Washington State Department of Ecology fined DOE $500,000 for the spill.
Energy Department Fined $500,000 for Hanford Radioactive Spill (Environment News Service)
Still More Trouble at Hanford
In August 2007 the Government Accountability Project (GAP) complained to DOE officials about environmental and worker safety problems being committed by contractors at Hanford. The complaints centered on Washington Closure Hanford (WCH), a limited liability corporation owned by Washington Group International, Bechtel and CH2M Hill, which is under contract to demolish hundreds of old facilities, clean up waste storage sites and temporarily store plutonium production reactors.
In an 18-page letter (PDF) to DOE, GAP accused WCH of “ongoing safety and environmental violations, retaliatory work environments and failure to oversee subcontractors.” GAP cited instances where workers and the environment were exposed to dangerous contaminants and federal safety regulations were not followed.
In response, DOE wrote a
(PDF) saying WCH had addressed the concerns cited by GAP. DOE also refused to launch an independent investigation into the violations, as requested by the watchdog organization.
- Table of Contents
- Overview
- History
- What it Does
- Where Does the Money Go
- Controversies
- Suggested Reforms
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Office of Health, Safety and Security
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