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National Nuclear Security Administration

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Overview:

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for overseeing the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Using private contractors to run day-to-day operations, the NNSA manages highly-classified research laboratories and nuclear defense facilities that maintain the stockpile of nuclear weapons as well as provide the propulsion systems for the US Navy’s nuclear fleet.

 
Born out of controversy, the NNSA has struggled since its creation in 2000 to move past the mistakes of the DOE that led Congress to establish this new agency. Security failures involving foreign espionage prompted the administration of President Bill Clinton and Congress to reorganize the DOE and entrust the NNSA with the duty of taking care of the nation’s post-Cold War arsenal of nuclear weapons. The NNSA, however, has repeatedly been criticized for its own lapses in security and other blunders.
 
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History:

During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States entrusted the production of its nuclear weapons first to the Atomic Energy Commission from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, then briefly to the Energy Research and Development Administration in the mid-‘70s, and finally to the Department of Energy from 1977 until the present. At its height, the nation’s nuclear weapons complex consisted of 15 major facilities, and another dozen smaller ones, that conducted research and development (R&D), produced nuclear fuel and assembled warheads.

 

 

 

 
Although security was critical for such a sensitive operation, protecting the nation’s nuclear secrets proved difficult from the very beginning. In the 1940s and early 1950s, two major espionage scandals rocked the country. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed for giving the Soviets classified documents from the Manhattan Project, the nation’s top-secret project that produced the first atom bombs. Another breach in security involved Klaus Fuchs, a German-born physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project, who gave nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union during World War II.
 
Although other cases of espionage would occur during the Cold War, none directly involved scientists working for the nuclear weapons complex. But then in the mid 1990s, scandal arose again, this time involving China. An investigation by the House Select Committee on U.S. Nuclear Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, chaired by Christopher Cox (R-CA), found that China had developed a number of key warheads based on U.S. designs, although the committee was unable to prove that this information was acquired through espionage. This report reaffirmed suspicions by American defense and intelligence officials who had warned since the late 1970s that Chinese spies were trying to infiltrate American laboratories.
 
Meanwhile, the FBI began an investigation, code-named "Kindred Spirit," of persons who had access to American nuclear warhead information. This led to the much-publicized arrest and trial of Wen Ho Lee, a computer scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 1999. The Taiwanese-born Lee had been an employee at LANL for 21 years when he was arrested by the FBI, charged with not properly securing classified materials and failing to report meetings with individuals from "sensitive" countries and held for a year. Some observers maintained that Lee was a scapegoat, and some Asian Americans charged that his arrest was motivated by racism. At his trial in September 2000, Lee was convicted on only one of the charges against him—illegally gathering and retaining national security data. The court released him on time served and ordered him to undergo 60 hours of government debriefing.
 
Although the Wen Ho Lee scandal garnered a great deal of public attention, the most damaging news about the state of America’s nuclear weapons laboratories came from a report by a White House blue-ribbon panel during the Clinton presidency. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board issued “Science at its Best, Security at its Worst” in June 1999 – the first time in its 35-year history that the PFIAB had ever issued a public report. The findings were damning.
 
The report characterized the DOE-run nuclear weapons complex as “a large organization saturated with cynicism, an arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of denial,” adding, “no President, Energy Secretary, or Congress has been able to stem the recurrence of fundamental problems. All have been thwarted time after time by the intransigence of this institution.” Some of the eye-opening discoveries included:
  • Classified documents detailing the designs of the most advanced nuclear weapons were found on library shelves accessible to the public at the Los Alamos laboratory.
  • Employees and researchers were receiving little, if any, training or instruction regarding espionage threats.
  • Multiple chains of command and standards of performance negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency, confusion and mistrust.
  • Inexact tracking of the quantities and flows of nuclear materials.
 
The panel pointed out that DOE leaders had been presented with overwhelming evidence that their lackadaisical oversight could lead to an increase in the nuclear threat against the United States, citing scores of critical reports from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the intelligence community, independent commissions, private management consultants, the DOE Inspector General and its own security experts. The report concluded that the DOE and the weapons labs were incapable of reforming themselves—bureaucratically and culturally—thanks to a “deeply-rooted culture of low regard for and, at times, hostility to security issues, which has continually frustrated the efforts of its internal and external critics.”
 
A recommendation was made for the nuclear weapons labs and facilities to be placed within a new semi–autonomous agency within DOE that had a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability. Congress and the Clinton administration liked this idea and pushed through legislation in 2000 creating the National Nuclear Security Administration.
 
Science at its Best, Security at its Worst (President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)
U.S. Will Broaden Investigation of China Nuclear Secrets Case (by James Risen and David Johnston, New York Times)

Breach at Los Alamos: A special report; China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say

(by James Risen and Jeff Gerth, New York Times)

 

 

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What it Does:

The NNSA is responsible for maintaining and enhancing the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear weapons labs and facilities. It is also charged with nuclear non-proliferation duties overseas, provides the U.S. Navy with nuclear propulsion systems and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. It does all this through the work of eight offices: Defense Programs; Nuclear Nonproliferation; Naval Reactors; Emergency Operations; Infrastructure and Environment; Nuclear Security; Management and Administration; and Office of the Administrator.

 

 

NNSA Reading Room

 
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States stopped producing new nuclear warheads and began a moratorium on nuclear testing. The main focus shifted to sustaining existing warheads for the indefinite future. To this end, the DOE adopted the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which the Office of Defense Programs now runs.
 
 
With the threat of war against the former Soviet Union over, American policymakers began focusing more attention to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction in developing countries. The Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation works with officials in Russia and other former Soviet republics to keep nuclear fuel and other technologies secure. It conducts nonproliferation efforts in more than 60 countries through bilateral and multilateral arrangements.
 
The Naval Reactors Program is responsible for providing the U.S. Navy with nuclear propulsion plants. The office oversees R&D of new reactor technology, monitors reactor operations and helps with the disposal of decommissioned reactor plants.
 
In the event of a nuclear attack or radiological outbreak in the US or overseas, the Office of Emergency Operations dispatches specialized teams to help mitigate any threat. The office also conducts training in partnership with other federal agencies to help prepare for such emergencies.
 
The Office of Infrastructure and Environment is responsible for upgrading or rebuilding existing NNSA facilities. It also assists with environmental cleanup at NNSA sites, both past and present, in conjunction with other federal agencies and local stakeholders.
 
The Nuclear Security Program is responsible for protecting NNSA personnel, facilities, nuclear weapons and government information from threats, including terrorism. It employs three main strategies: monitor and evaluate contractors running NNSA sites to ensure they comply with security protocols; implement training programs of employees to sustain and improve security safeguards; and research technology options to help reduce manpower-intensive protection strategies.
 
This office provides NNSA headquarters staff with services involving human resources, public information, procurement, administrative services, budgeting and diversity training.
 

This office supports the leadership of the NNSA, including its top official, who holds the title of Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration and Undersecretary for Nuclear Security at the Department of Energy.

 

 

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Where Does the Money Go:

The NNSA’s primary stakeholders are those corporations contracted to run the day-to-day operations at the agency’s 11 nuclear labs and facilities. In addition to contractors, a wide array of public interest and anti-nuclear groups also pay close attention to the work of the NNSA. These include the Federation of American Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Security.org, the Center for Defense Information, Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Project on Government Oversight, Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, Snake River Alliance, Atlanta Women’s Action for New Directions, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Physicians for Social Responsibility, to name just a few.

 

 
The following is a list of NNSA labs and facilities and the companies running them:
 
One of the premiere nuclear weapons labs during the Cold War, Lawrence Livermore was run by the University of California system from its beginning in 1952 until September 2007. Today, UC continues to help run the lab as part of a consortium involving engineering companies Bechtel, Babcock & Wilcox and Washington Group International, science and technology company Battelle and the Texas A&M University System.
 
The Nevada Test Site is a massive outdoor laboratory (larger than the state of Rhode Island) and one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. Established by the Atomic Energy Commission to serve as the testing ground for both surface and underground nuclear blasts, the Nevada Test Site hosted more than four decades of nuclear weapons testing until the nuclear weapons testing moratorium in 1992. The site now is used for hazardous chemical spill testing, emergency response training, conventional weapons testing and waste management and environmental technology studies. As of August 2008, the site will be fully managed by National Security Technologies LLC, a joint venture involving defense contractor Northrop Grumman, construction corporation AECOM, engineering giant CH2M Hill, and nuclear catchall company Nuclear Fuel Services.
 
Naval Reactors Facilities (Idaho, Pittsburgh, Schenectady)
The Naval Reactors facilities are involved in the research, design, fabrication, construction, testing and operation of naval nuclear propulsion systems. Idaho and Pittsburgh Naval Reactors are run by Bechtel-Bettis while Schenectady is run by Lockheed Martin.
 
The original home of the Manhattan Project where the first atomic bombs were built, Los Alamos National Laboratory has a long history of providing key research for nuclear weapons programs. It is run by the Los Alamos National Security LLC, consisting of the University of California system, Bechtel, Babcock & Wilcox and Washington Group International.
 
Since 1949, Sandia National Laboratories has conducted research for nuclear weapons programs and other national security-related programs. It is run by a division of Lockheed Martin Company.
 
Serving as the nation’s central facility for assembling and dismantling nuclear warheads, Pantex is run by Babcock & Wilcox.
 
A high-tech research production facility that historically was charged with providing many of the non-nuclear components for nuclear warheads, the Kansas City Plant is run by defense giant Honeywell.
 
Run by Babcock & Wilcox, Y-12 is one of the original Manhattan Project facilities that produced uranium for warheads. Today, programs at Y-12 include manufacturing, reworking and dismantling nuclear weapons components and storing special nuclear materials.
 

Once a key supplier of nuclear fuel for warheads, Savannah River still provides nuclear materials for warheads. It is run by a joint venture involving Bechtel, Babcock & Wilcox and CH2M Hill.

 

 

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Controversies:

In the eight years since it was established, the NNSA has struggled to avoid controversy, much like its predecessors at the DOE who were charged with running the nation’s nuclear weapons labs and facilities. In 2003, the NNSA decided to abolish an independent, external technical advisory committee consisting of physicists and technical experts with extensive knowledge of nuclear weapons, as well as former government officials and retired senior military officers. NNSA leadership cited an administrative burden of supporting the committee among reasons for doing away with it. The decision provoked criticism from the Union of Concerned Scientists which included the dismissal of the advisory committee in its report, “Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An investigation into the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science.”

 

 
 
In addition to the UCS report, the NNSA has been criticized in reports by the Government Accountability Office and the Inspector General of the DOE. In January 2007, the GAO found security lacking at several nuclear facilities, including the Nevada Test Site, Sandia National Laboratories and Y-12, along with failures in cybersecurity throughout the NNSA system.
 
The DOE’s Inspector General also complained of delays by NNSA in implementing changes affecting safeguards and security at nuclear facilities as well as potential morale problems.
 
In September 2007, the IG’s office issued another report criticizing NNSA for falling behind in constructing a high-priority radiological/nuclear complex at the Nevada Test Site for use by Department of Homeland Security. The NNSA failed to fast-track the project as requested and incurred cost overruns.
 
Additionally, other NNSA gaffes have included:
 
In June 2006, NNSA waited nine months before informing top DOE officials that a computer hacker had stolen sensitive data on 1,500 employees. NNSA’s top administrator at the time, Linton Brooks, had no explanation for why the Secretary of Energy nor the employees weren’t told sooner of the theft. The failure provoked bipartisan outrage, including calls for Brooks’ immediate resignation by Republican Joe Barton, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee subcommittee on oversight and investigations.
 
In October 2006, it was discovered that a worker at Los Alamos National Laboratories had illegally downloaded and removed classified data from the LANL site.
University hit with proposed $3M fine for breach (by Jaikumar Vijayan, Computerworld)
 
In the wake of the aforementioned mistakes, NNSA’s Administrator Linton Brooks resigned in January ’07. Brooks, a former ambassador and arms control negotiator, had drawn adverse publicity for other questionable moves, such as recommending the installation of Gatling guns outside Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to protect it from terrorist attacks.
 
The replacement of Brooks as head of NNSA hasn’t stemmed the tide of bad publicity. In January 2008, it was reported that seven security guards had been caught sleeping at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant since 2000. All were employees of Wackenhut Services Inc., a large private security firm, which the NNSA contracts with. Y-12 is considered a potential terrorist target because of the facility’s large storehouse of uranium.
 

Some question whether the Bush administration’s Reliable Replacement Warhead is an attempt to develop a new nuclear weapon without Congressional approval.

 

 

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Comments

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jeff kinkade 2 years ago
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Founded: 2000
Annual Budget: $9.1 billion
Employees: 2,500
Official Website: http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/
National Nuclear Security Administration
Miller, Neile
Acting Administrator

Neile L. Miller, who has been the principal deputy administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) since August 2010, will become acting administrator on January 18, 2013, upon the retirement of current director Thomas P. D’Agostino. NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for overseeing the nation’s nuclear weapons complex.

 

Born circa 1957, Miller is a 1975 graduate of Framingham North High School in Framingham, Massachusetts, going on to earn a B.A. in Political Science at Vassar College in 1979 and an M.S. in Foreign Service at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1981.

 

Miller started her career at the Congressional Research Service, working on nuclear nonproliferation issues. In 1987, she joined the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the program examiner for the DOE’s radioactive waste management programs and for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. From 2003 to 2004, Miller served in DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, first as associate director for Resource Management and then as associate director of International Nuclear Cooperation.

 

She returned to OMB to serve as a senior program examiner in the National Security Division from August 2004 to October 2007, where she was responsible for overseeing NNSA programs and the Defense Department Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Returning to DOE, she served as the Department’s budget director from October 2007 to August 2010, where she managed its $29 billion annual budget.

 

In the private sector, Miller has worked for Cogema, Inc., and as a consultant for clients including DOE, Sandia National Laboratory, and the government of Germany. She also served as policy and communications officer in the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, France.

 

Miller and her husband, nuclear scientist Dr. Werner Lutze, have two sons, Max and Daniel.

-Matt Bewig

 

Official Biography

Nomination Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee (pdf)

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D'Agostino, Thomas
Previous Undersecretary

Thomas Paul D'Agostino has served since August 2007 as the Undersecretary for Nuclear Security at the Department of Energy and the Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1980 with a bachelor’s in Physical Science, from Johns Hopkins University in 1992 with a master’s in Business Finance and from the Naval War College in 1997 with a master’s in National Security Studies.

 
He spent eight years on active duty in the navy as a submarine officer onboard the USS SKIPJACK (SSN 585) and with the Board of Inspection and Survey where he was the main propulsion and nuclear reactor inspector. D'Agostino achieved the rank of captain in the U.S. Naval Reserves where he has served with the Navy Inspector General and with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare in developing concepts for new attack submarine propulsion systems. He later served with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations in the Navy Command Center in the Pentagon where he was the French Desk Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for all politico-military interactions with the French Navy and served as the duty captain at the Navy Command Center.
 
From 1989 to 1996, D'Agostino worked in numerous assignments within the federal government in the startup of the department's tritium production reactors and at the Naval Sea Systems Command as a program manager for the SEAWOLF submarine propulsion system. He then became the deputy director for the Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, and Simulation Program where he directed the formulation of programs and budget for R&D supporting the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) at the DOE. He later served as the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration where he supported the deputy administrator and directed the formulation of the programs, plans and budget for the SSP. He first joined the NNSA as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and directed the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
 
 
 
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