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Timor-Leste

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Overview

Timor-Leste is situated on the eastern half of the island of Timor, located in the Lesser Sunda Islands of Indonesia in South East Asia. The Dutch and the Portuguese established trading bases in Timor, which was originally occupied by Australasian migrants. Conflict between the two European countries between 1642 and 1906 culminated in the establishment of present-day boundaries and shared power. Timor experienced general instability during and after World War II. Japan occupied it during the war, followed by Portugal. The 1974 coup in Portugal forced it to decolonize Timor. Efforts were now underway to stabilize the newly decolonized territory, but were unsuccessful given the feud between the major political parties. Indonesia took advantage of this situation and invaded in 1975. Backed by the United States government under the Gerald Ford administration, the Indonesian government took control of the land and in the process eliminated hundreds of thousands of Timorese through starvation and violence.

International solidarity movements were growing, while the US continued to sell arms to Indonesia. In 1999, President Bill Clinton severed all ties and President Suharto of Indonesia was forced out to be replaced by his Vice President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie.
 
Habibie gave the Timorese the option of either becoming part of Indonesia or independent. The voters chose independence and were met with a full scale military incursion. Thousands died or were displaced until violence was ended by an Australian military intervention in 1999.
 
Timor-Leste became an independent republic in May 2002, with Xanana Gusmao as president, and it joined the United Nations in September of that year. Violence has continued to plague Timor-Leste since then. In April 2006, unrest in Dili resulted in widespread rioting, with more than 600 soldiers deserting their barracks. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri called the violence a “coup” and asked for international assistance.. Australia, Portugal, New Zealand and Malaysia deployed troops to help quell the violence.
 
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Basic Information

Lay of the Land: The Democratic Republic of East Timor occupies the eastern half of the island of Timor, in Indonesia’s Lesser Sunda Islands, plus the enclave of Ocussi on the northern coast of west Timor.

 
Population: 1.1 million
 
Religions: Catholic 98%, Protestant 1%, Muslim 1%.
 
Ethnic Groups: Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Papuan, small Chinese minority.
 
Languages: Mambae 8.0%, Makaae 7.0%, Tukudede 6.3%, Tetun (official) 5.0%, Tetun Dili 5.0%, Kemak 5.0%, Bunak 5.0%, Galoli 5.0%, IFaltaluku 3.0%, Baikeno 2.0%, Idaté 0.5%, Portuguese (official). There are 19 living languages in East Timor.
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History

The island of Timor was originally settled as the result of Australasian migration from 40,000-20,000 BC. Its people came from Sri Lanka, Australia and Indonesia, as well as China and Indo-China.

 
Early settlers did not have much contact with the outside world, except when seafaring traders from China and India visited. In the early 16th century, Portuguese and Dutch traders established contact with Timor, setting up a spice trade, as well as missions. East Timor has been largely neglected regarding investment in its development and primarily used as a trading post by the various colonial powers. In 1642, the Portuguese moved into Timor, coming into conflict with the Dutch, who had settled the western end of the island.
 
In 1906, East Timor’s present-day boundaries were established, with the two colonial powers sharing the island. From 1942-1945, Japan occupied all of Timor, but Portugal resumed colonial authority over East Timor in 1945, after the Japanese were defeated by the allies.
 
In 1974, a military coup in Lisbon, Portugal forced a rapid and disorganized decolonization period in East Timor. Political tensions on the island heated up on August 11, 1975, and the Timorese Democratic Union Party (UDT) launched a coup d’état in Dili. This was followed by a brief but bloody civil war, in which the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) pushed UDT forces into Indonesian West Timor.
 
FRETILIN claimed victory in late September of that year, while Indonesian forces began incursions into East Timor. On October 16, five journalists from Australia, Britain, and New Zealand were murdered in the East Timorese town of Balibo shortly after they had filmed regular Indonesian army troops invading East Timorese territory.
 
On November 28, FRETILIN declared East Timor an independent state, and Indonesia responded by launching a full-scale military invasion on December 7. The attack, dubbed “Operation Komodo” by the Indonesian military, not only involved military equipment provided by the United States, but the administration of President Gerald Ford secretly ”okayed” the operation with President Suharto of Indonesia. On December 22, 1975, the UN Security Council called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor, but it refused.
 
On January 13, 1976, an Indonesian-backed puppet provisional government was established in East Timor to prevent the consolidation of power by the FRETILIN party. The Indonesians claimed that FRETILIN was a communist party, even though the party’s leadership claimed it was social democratic. However, claims made by the Indonesians were accepted in the West, and major international powers had little incentive to confront Indonesia.
 
Meanwhile, support among the East Timorese for the guerilla resistance increased, indicating that the Indonesian presence was not welcome, and the Indonesian occupation was never given official recognition by the United Nations.
 
On May 31, 1976, a “Peoples Assembly” in Dili endorsed an Act of Integration. On July 17, East Timor became the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian occupation was characterized by brutal military repression. Beginning in the late 1980s, the occupation was increasingly characterized by programs to win the “hearts-and-minds” of the Timorese through the use of economic development assistance and job creation. But serious human rights violations continued. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 Timorese lost their lives to violence and hunger during this period.
 
On November 12, 1991, the Dili Massacre occurred, and became a turning point. This led the US to cut off funding for Indonesian military personnel. But the US continued to sell arms to Indonesia’s government, led by President Suharto, until President Bill Clinton cut off all US military ties in 1999. The Australian government followed suit that same year. A burgeoning pro-independence movement grew among the East Timorese along with growing solidarity movements in Portugal, Australia and the United States.
 
In the mid-1990s, the pro-democracy People’s Democratic Party (PRD) in Indonesia called for withdrawal from East Timor. The party’s leadership was arrested in July 1996. In July 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela called upon Suharto to free the imprisoned Xanana Gusmão. Instead, Suharto said he would take three months off Gusmão’s two-year sentence.
 
The following year, Suharto finally stepped down after a dictatorial reign that lasted four decades. On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced his government’s plan to allow the people of East Timor to choose between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. Under an agreement brokered by the United Nations, a referendum was held in East Timor on August 30, 1999—with 78% voting for independence. In response, Timorese militias supported by the Indonesian military (TNI) launched a full-scale campaign of retribution.
 
Pro-independence FALINTIL guerillas remained cantoned in UN-supervised camps while the TNI killed approximately 1,300 Timorese, and forcibly relocated 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly all of the country’s electrical grid, were destroyed.
 
On September 20, 1999, Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) were deployed, bringing an end to the violence. Activists in Portugal, Australia and the United States pressured their governments to take action and President Bill Clinton threatened Indonesia with the withdrawal of IMF loans. Indonesia agreed to withdraw its troops and allow multinational forces into East Timor to stabilize the area. The UN also authorized the creation of a multinational military force known as INTERFET (International Force for East Timor).
 
Timor-Leste became a fully independent republic with a parliamentary form of government on May 20, 2002, following two and a half years under the authority of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In August 2001, the country chose its first parliament, in the country’s first free and fair elections. FRETILIN won the majority of seats, and Mari Alkatiri, FRETILIN’s secretary general, became the first prime minister. 
 
On April 14, 2002, Xanana Gusmao was elected president, and East Timor became a member of the UN on September 27. UNTAET’s mandate ended with East Timor’s independence, but a successor organization, the UN Mission for the Support of East Timor (UNMISET), was established to provide additional support to the government. UNMISET’s mandate expired on May 20, 2005 after the UN Security Council unanimously approved the creation of a small special political mission in Timor-Leste. The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) took its place.
 
In April 2006, Dili experienced rioting in support of 600 East Timorese soldiers who were dismissed for deserting their barracks. In the resulting violence, five people were killed, and 20,000 fled their homes. Additional violence, between government forces and Falintil troops, broke out later that year as a result of the unfair distribution of funds from oil production on the seabed area between East Timor, Indonesia and Australia. This area has been highly contested by all parties claiming sovereign right to the profits generated. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri called the violence a “coup” and welcomed offers of foreign military assistance from several nations. On May 25, 2006, military personnel from Australia, Portugal, New Zealand and Malaysia deployed to East Timor to quell the violence.
 
On June 21, 2006, President Gusmao formally requested Prime Minister Alkatiri step down. FRETILIN party members accused him of lying about distributing weapons to civilians. Alkatiri resigned on June 26, 2006. Gusmao appointed José Ramos-Horta as Alkatiris’ successor. In April 2007 violence broke out in the run-up to the election due to political divide. President Gusmao declined to run for another term.
 
The results of the 2007 presidential election came after two rounds of voting. The first round eliminated 6 out of the 8 candidates. The two remaining, José Ramos-Horta took 21.81% of the votes as an independent and Francisco Guterrez took 27.89% as a member of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. (FREITLIN) The second round of voting showed Ramos-Horta win 69.18% of the votes and Guterrez 30.82% of the votes. Both rounds had more or less the same amount of people votes with 403,941 for the first round and 413,177 in the second.
 
Violence and instability made up the backdrop of the election. Different political factions were fighting for power with the support of different security forces, Violence between police and army units caused widespread gang violence. Much of the instability was due to the rebel Alfredo Reinado. Reinado was trained by Australian forces and at one point was the head of the East Timor military. After watching some of his fellow soldiers fire upon a group of demonstrators in Dili, he decided to leave his barracks. As the head of a rebel group, he was involved in riots against the established government and promised to die for his country. In spite of the violence, Ramos-Horta was sworn in as president, with Gusmao taking the position of prime minister. In February 2008, President Ramos-Horta was critically injured in an assassination attempt led by the rogue soldier, Alfredo Reinado, who was killed by the Timor Leste Defense Force. (F-FDTL) Gusmao was also attacked during the failed coup, but managed to escape unscathed. The violence in the run up to the election culminated with 37 dead and more than 150,000 displaced, at which point Australian forces intervened. Australia has remained in the country in the face of formal requests from the Timorese country for assistance. They maintain 400 military personnel under Operation ASTUTE.
 
Timor (Wikipedia)
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Timor-Leste's Newspapers
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History of U.S. Relations with Timor-Leste

The years of the Cold War were of much concern to the United States. The US government feared the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia and viewed it as a national security threat. Thus, when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, the US government—unlike others in the international community—did not object to the military action, given that the Indonesian government led by Suharto was in effect combating communism. In fact, as the years wore on, it was revealed that the administration of President Gerald Ford, which included Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, approved the invasion. While the international community protested, the US government doubled military aid to Indonesia and prevented the United Nations from taking effective action against the country. During this period, US relations with East Timor were highly influenced by its relations with Indonesia. Because the US was engaged in a Cold War against communism, foreign government had only to claim they were fighting communism to gain US support. This is what the Indonesian military did and successfully won over President Gerald Ford, who aided and approved the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. Much of the Indonesian military’s weaponry was supplied by the US. These weapons were supposedly to be used only in the act of self-defense. The brutal and violent tactics used by the Indonesian military caused an outcry from human rights organizations around the world. Human rights groups in the US were responsible for pressuring Congress into acknowledging and ultimately cutting ties with the Indonesian government over human rights abuses. The U.S. Congress contemplated cutting all aid, including World Bank loans, to Indonesia. In the face of such opposition and the possible elimination of a major source of money, the Indonesian military finally withdrew all of its forces from East Timor by the October 31, 1999. An international peacekeeping force made up of UN peacekeeping forces led by Australia was established to maintain order until power could be turned over to an independent East Timor government body.

 
 
The United States continued to provide grant aid training to Indonesia under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program until 1992, when Congress finally cut the aid as a reaction to the human rights situation in East Timor. This restriction was partially lifted in 1995. Military assistance programs were again suspended, however, in the aftermath of the violence and destruction in East Timor following the August 30, 1999, referendum favoring independence. Given that independence was favored among the Timorese, the Indonesian military again intervened with violent tactics. It was at this point that the US completely severed ties with Indonesia, including cutting off loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
 
The United States established diplomatic relations with Timor-Leste on May 20, 2002.
 
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Current U.S. Relations with Timor-Leste

The United States Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Forty base at Camp Lenhoff in the capital Dilli serves as a base for the navy’s Seabees. Seabees is a branch of the navy which is comprised mainly of civil engineers and personnel with other construction skills whose purpose is to provide improvements in infrastructure wherever they are based. According to the US embassy in East Timor, the Seabees purpose in East Timor is to “coordinate with the Timor-Leste Government and other international partners on infrastructure project development in order to improve essential infrastructure, service capabilities, and foster goodwill. They have completed 14 projects, including a medical clinic in Osso Huna, a market building in Baucau, and a soccer stadium in Gleno.” They have also provided improvements to the cities university.

 
In late 2009, the US military conducted joint-training exercises with the Timor Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) as well as various humanitarian tasks. In the 10-week exercise, US Marines and the navy will be repairing schools and opening free dental and medical clinics throughout East Timor. Their purpose is to improve the welfare of the Timorese people but also to improve and expand cooperation between the US and East Timor.
 
According to the US ambassador to East Timor Hans Klemm, “the fundamental objective of our interaction is a stable Timor-Leste better able to provide for its own defense and capable of contributing positively to regional security.” To this end, US military involvement has included improving the Timorese military’s professionalism and capacity in providing security and stability. It has therefore seen fit to develop close relationships with both key security institutions and civilian institutions to improve their overall functioning.
The Indonesian government is currently urging the Obama administration to resume joint-training of military units accused of committing human rights abuses during its incursion into East Timor. However, they do not want to force any deal with strings attached. They want the U.S. to willingly resume its former operations in conjunction with the Indonesian government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
 
In 2006, seven Timorese visited the US. The number of Timorese traveling to the US has stayed below 30 since 2002.
 
The Pitfalls of UN Nation-building (by Robert McMahon, Council on Foreign Relations)
 
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Where Does the Money Flow

Commerce between the US and Timor-Leste is very small. In 2009, US imports totaled $66,000 and exports $2.4 million. The largest exports were material handlings equipment ($321,000), civilian aircraft, engines, equipment and parts ($320,000), industrial machines ($191,000), telecommunications equipment ($188,000) and sports apparel and gear ($152,000).

 
The US also contributes funds to a number of multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, which assist the island nation. Aid from the US to Timor-Leste totaled $273 million from 2000-2008.
 
The U.S. Congressional Budget for Foreign Operations requested $14.6 million in total aid for East Timor in 2010. This fell by $9.7 million from the amount spent in 2009.The 2010 budget allotted the funds to development aid ($10.3 million), Global Health and Child Survival- USAID ($2 million), Foreign Military Financing ($1 million), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement ($860,000) and International Military Education and Training ($400,000).
 
Key Interest Areas in East Timor 2010
Microenterprise- $2.5 million
Agriculture and related Programs – $1.7 million
Family Planning and Reproductive Health- $1 million
Maternal and Child Health- $1 million
Trade Capacity Building- $1 million
 
The US government is primarily concerned with aiding East Timor’s transition to a stable democracy with a free and open economy. It has thus invested in 4 different sectors: Peace and Security ($1.6 million), Governing Justly and Democratically ($5.4 million), Economic Growth ($5.5 million) and People ($2 million).
 
The first sector is responsible for modernizing and improving efficiency and professionalism in both the police and the military. The instability that has plagued the country for decades has called for reform in both its police force and the judicial system. An American Resident Legal Advisor will be charged with aiding in this reform.
 
According to the US State Department, the second sector is charged with strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as reducing corruption and rewarding good governance and strengthening civil society. USAID support is mainly concerned with strengthening the countries criminal Justice institutions. It will focus on improving the Office of the Prosecutor-General. In order to keep this institution in check, USAID will also attempt to improve civil society’s ability to monitor the system’s administration of justice. This includes enhancing the freedom of the press and local organizations.
 
According to the US State Department, the third sector aims at promoting economic growth by pushing private sector competitiveness to enhance innovation and efficiency. It is also aiding the development of the agricultural sector and creating economic opportunities for the population. This will require the development of a land titling and registration system. This will prevent conflict and facilitate land development through private investment. The agricultural sector will need major improvements if there are to be improved or new economic opportunities given that 85% of the population is engaged in this sector.
 
According to the US State Department, the fourth sector will be responsible for allocating the funds in health improvement related programs. “USAID programs will continue to address Timor-Leste’s appalling health statistics through maternal and child health interventions, such as immunization for vaccine-preventable childhood diseases; improved nutrition and micronutrient care; malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia prevention and treatment programs, including water, sanitation and hygiene promotion; and child spacing.”
 
Timor-Leste (Office of the United States Trade Representative)
Timor-Leste (USAID)
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Controversies

President Obama Considers Resuming Joint-Training of Indonesian Forces Linked to Atrocities in East Timor.

In 2010, President Obama was scheduled to visit Indonesia to sign pending agreements including the revocation of a U.S. ban on aid to military groups with a history of human rights abuses like “Kopassus.” According to The Washington Post, the U.S. will not support any military units with this kind of history unless the Timorese government is attempting to bring those guilty to justice. Obama’s strategy is to approach younger soldiers in the unit who could not have taken part in the atrocities because of their age.
 
Obama’s Intelligence Chief Ignored Orders Regarding East Timor
Before joining the Obama administration as Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair’s last job in the military was a three-year stint as commander-in-chief of United States Pacific Command, the highest ranking officer over all US forces in the Asia-Pacific region. While serving in this command, Blair reportedly disobeyed orders from the Clinton administration during the 1999 East Timorese crisis. Amid growing violence against the independence movement in Indonesian-occupied East Timor, Blair was ordered to meet with General Wiranto, commander of the Indonesian military, to tell him to shut down the pro-Indonesia militia. The admiral failed to deliver this message during his meeting with Wiranto, and instead gave the Indonesian general an offer of military assistance and a personal invitation to be Blair’s guest in Hawaii. Months later, after killings of independence supporters had grown, Blair was sent back to Indonesia and, following civilian orders, cut off all American ties to the Indonesian military.
The Bloody Career of Admiral Dennis C. Blair (by Bradley Simpson, Uruknet.info)
Blair Is Steeped in the Ways Intelligence Works (by Dana Priest, Washington Post)
 
US Military Trains Indonesian Special Ops with Dark Past
In 2007, the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) strongly condemned American training for two Indonesian military units. ETAN urged the US Congress to intervene to prevent such training and called on the Bush administration to publicly pledge not to provide further assistance to the two units. The units in question were Kopassus, an Indonesian Special Forces unit with a long record of human rights violations, and Brimob, a para-military mobile police brigade. Dr. Damien Kingsbury, an Australian expert on the Indonesian military, has written that “Kopassus has murdered and tortured political activists, trade unionists and human rights workers. It has also trained, equipped and led militias in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, and Kopassus members trained the notorious Laskar Jihad Islamic militia, which stepped up conflict in the Ambon region, leaving up to 10,000 dead.”
 
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Human Rights

 

According to the US State Department, “International security forces in the country included the UN Police (UNPOL) within the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the International Stabilization Force (ISF), neither of which was under the direct control of the government. The national security forces are the National Police (PNTL) and Defense Forces (F-FDTL). While the government generally maintained control over these forces, there were problems with discipline and accountability.”
 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and other national leaders publicly acknowledged the extent of official corruption. The law provides for criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices. The country does not have financial disclosure laws. Gusmão required that all cabinet officials in his government complete financial disclosure documents, but by the end of 2008 none had done so.
 
The most serious human rights issues are those that involve the Timorese security forces. According to the State Department, the most common include “police use of excessive force during arrest and abuse of authority; perception of impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention; and an inefficient and understaffed judiciary that deprived citizens of due process and an expeditious and fair trial. Domestic violence, rape, and sexual abuse were also problems.
 
The aforementioned PNTL and the F-FDTL lack efficiency and professionalism and therefore make it difficult to uphold the rule of law. US cooperation hopes to improve in these areas through joint-training programs.
 
According to the State Department, “there were incidents of cruel or degrading treatment of civilians by police and military personnel.” Members of Parliament, NGOs, the UN, and the Office of the Ombudsman received numerous complaints of use of excessive force by personnel of the Joint Command or National Police (PNTL) during the state of emergency. The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste’s (UNMIT) human rights unit and NGOs received numerous complaints of excessive force and degrading treatment by the Dili Task Force, a rapid reaction police unit created in December 2007.
According to the US State Department, Sample Cases against the security forces included:
 
February to May 2008- “Ombudsman’s office investigated 40 cases of mistreatment committed by PNTL or F-FDTL personnel during the state of siege.”
November 2008- “Two police officers accused of the assault of a woman. They were sentenced to two and six months’ suspended imprisonment, the two remained on active duty.”
June 7, 2009- “F-FDTL personnel beat two civilians and reportedly pointed their weapons at      UNPOL members after breaking up a fight between two martial arts groups.”
            June 2009- “F-FDTL member allegedly threatened and beat a residential security guard.”
September 26, 2009- “A group of F-FDTL members physically assaulted a Timorese woman and two foreign military personnel.”
 
The PNTL as an institution remained poorly equipped and under-trained, subject to numerous credible allegations of abuse of authority, mishandling of firearms, and corruption. Some police officers did not pass the vetting process and were on suspension pending further investigation.
 
There were reports of arbitrary interference with privacy and home. During the state of emergency, there were at least three instances in which the PNTL or Joint Command carried out searches without warrants.
 
“UNMIT personnel noted allegations of mistreatment of detainees by prison guards during the first 72 hours of imprisonment and a lack of special facilities for the mentally ill, who consequently were detained along with other prisoners.” Police station detention cells generally did not comply with international standards and lacked sanitation facilities and bedding.
 
According to Human Rights Watch, the major problem in East Timor is impunity. There have been many cases of excessive use of force by the police. “We were shocked to find so many credible accounts of torture and severe ill-treatment by police officers,” said Brad Adams, Asia director for Human Rights Watch. “East Timor won independence in part because of Indonesia’s horrific record here. Now some people are saying that the new police force is no better than the old one, and this should worry the government.”
According to HRW, “police and other state institutions in East Timor also regularly fail to respond appropriately to incidents of police abuse. The main internal police oversight body, the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit (PEDU), often fails to take cases of police abuse seriously, to follow up with complaints, or properly discipline the officers involved. Independent bodies that could take up cases of police abuse are ineffective and lack sufficient material or political support to succeed.”
“East Timor’s leaders are ignoring police abuse when they should be taking urgent steps to end it,” said Adams. “The people of East Timor have the right to expect better treatment from their own police force.”
Human Rights Watch also called for,  “international donors to express their concern about police torture to the government of East Timor; substantially increase support for independent monitoring of police violence and for agencies that can provide services for victims; and fund and plan for long-term strategies on capacity-building, training, and other support to the PNTL.”
 
The judicial sector is also inefficient. The system lacks the required number of qualified staff in order to function efficiently. In its present state, there is a major problem of case backlog.
 
Arbitrary arrest and detention occurred in many instances because magistrates or judges were unavailable. The extreme shortage of prosecutors and judges outside of the capital contributed to police inability to obtain required warrants. There was an extreme shortage of qualified public defenders, and many indigent defendants relied on lawyers provided by legal aid organizations. A number of defendants who were assigned public defenders reported that they had never seen their lawyer, and there were concerns that some low priority cases were being delayed indefinitely while suspects remained in pretrial detention.
 
The country’s judicial system faced a wide array of challenges including concerns about the impartiality of some judicial organs, a severe shortage of qualified personnel, a complex and multi-sourced legal regime, and the fact that the majority of the population does not speak Portuguese, the language in which the laws were written and the courts operated.
 
The trial process often was hindered by nonattendance of witnesses due to lack of proper notification or lack of transportation. The shortage of qualified prosecutors and technical staff in the office of the prosecutor general hampered its work.
 
The legal regime is complex and was inconsistently applied. Pending development of a complete set of national laws, Indonesian laws and the UN’s transitional regulations remained in effect. The constitution stipulates that UN regulations supersede Indonesian laws; however, this was inconsistently applied.
 
The Court of Appeals operated primarily in Portuguese. The UN regulations, many of which remained in force, were available in English, Portuguese, Indonesian, and Tetum (the language most widely spoken in the country). Laws enacted by parliament, intended to supplant Indonesian laws and UN regulations, were published in Portuguese but were seldom available in Tetum. Litigants, witnesses, and criminal defendants often were unable to read the new laws. Trials are required to be conducted in Portuguese and Tetum. However, the quality of translation provided in court varied widely, and translations into Tetum were often incomplete summaries. The prevalence of other local languages compounded this problem in the districts, particularly in Oecussi.
 
As in previous years, concerns arose in 2008 over the lack of witness-protection arrangements. In many violent crimes, witnesses were unwilling to testify because of the high potential for retribution against themselves or their families. Court personnel also reported increased concern regarding their own safety.
 
The law stipulates that all legislation, Supreme Court decisions (when the court is established), and decisions made by government bodies must be published in the official gazette. If not published, they are null and void. Regulations also provide for public access to court proceedings and decisions and the national budget and accounts. In practice there were concerns that public access to information was constrained. For example, the official gazette was published only in Portuguese, although by law it is to be published in Tetum as well. Moreover, its irregular publishing schedule and varying cost meant that few journalists, public servants, or others had regular access to it or knew how to access it.
 
The government suspended freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate during the state of emergency. There were credible reports that, following the February 11 attacks, members of the Joint Command explicitly warned villagers in Ermera against making human rights complaints.
 
Violence against women was a problem, and discrimination against women, persons with disabilities, and members of minority groups occurred. Outside of the capital, non-Catholic religious groups were at times regarded with suspicion. There were reports that Catholics who converted to other religions were subjected to harassment and abuse by community members. Gender-based violence remained a serious concern. Although rape is a crime, failures to investigate or prosecute cases of alleged rape and sexual abuse were common as were long delays.
 
Delay or refusal by police to investigate allegations of rape or domestic violence was a common problem.
Domestic violence against women was a significant problem often exacerbated by the reluctance of authorities to respond aggressively. Police also at times came under pressure from community members to ignore cases of domestic violence or sexual abuse.
 
Government regulations prohibit persons from organizing prostitution. However, under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Indonesian laws, prostitution is not illegal. Nonetheless, in past years there were reports of women being arrested for prostitution.
 
There was no law prohibiting sexual harassment, and sexual harassment was reportedly widespread, particularly within some government ministries and the police.
 
Some customary practices discriminate against women. For example, in some regions or villages where traditional practices hold sway, women may not inherit or own property. Traditional cultural practices such as payment of a bride price and occasionally polyandry also occurred.
 
In rural areas heavily indebted parents sometimes provided their children as indentured servants as a way to settle the debt. If the child was a girl, the receiving family may also demand any dowry payment normally owed to the girl’s parents.
 
Violence against children and child sexual assault was a significant problem. Some commercial sexual exploitation of minors occurred.
 
Thousands of children remained at risk due to their continued displacement. The capacity of the state, communities, and families to protect children was seriously challenged. Incidents of child abuse, including sexual abuse, were reported both inside and outside the IDP camps. Underreporting of child abuse was a problem.
 
In many districts children with disabilities were unable to attend school due to accessibility problems. During the year some persons with mental disabilities faced discriminatory or degrading treatment due in part to a lack of appropriate treatment resources or lack of referral to existing resources. Mentally ill persons were imprisoned with the general prison population and were denied needed psychiatric care.
 
According to Amnesty International, there are cases of forced labor in Malaysia that originate from Timor-Leste. Ramos, a 25-year-old plantation worker in Malaysia from Timor-Leste said, “Some workers did not know precisely how much was deducted from their wages.”He also stated that workers are often abused and mistakenly arrested by RELA, Malaysia People’s Volunteer Corps which is charged with preserving national security.
 
Following a meeting between President José Ramos –Horta and Amnesty International’s Secretary General, Claudio Cordone, a letter was issued for the president with regard to the meeting’s issues. According to the letter, “Amnesty International addressed the role of criminal justice in dealing with the crimes of the past in Timor-Leste, including the proposal to set up an international tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed during Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste between 1975 and 1999.”
 
According to Amnesty International, President Ramos-Horta has long objected such a tribunal but has stated that he will not oppose it if the international Security Council decided to establish it. On its part, Amnesty International has adamantly established its firm belief in the importance of the public’s confidence in the rule of law. The level of impunity seen during the Indonesian occupation can weaken such confidence and leave the system open to instability. The tribunal would act as an impartial external arbiter of the law and help curb corruption and improve on the national courts inability to address its responsibilities adequately.
 
The tribunal hopes not to enforce prosecutions in Timor-Leste for the crimes during the occupation but would do it in Indonesia as well as long as they are willing to cooperate. Amnesty International suggested these steps are only part of a long-run process aimed at addressing impunity.
 
Amnesty International also wrote a letter to all members of the UN Security Council urging it “to take immediate steps to address the continuing lack of accountability for crimes against humanity and other grave human rights violations which occurred in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) under Indonesia’s occupation.” This was a plea to renew the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).
 
According to the International Criminal Court, “Timor-Leste acceded to the Rome Statute on 6 September 2002, becoming the 79th State Party.” According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the aim of this is to achieve international Peace and Justice. Its aims are expanding justice for all, end impunity, help end conflicts, remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, take over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act, and to deter future war criminals. The current International Court of Justice at The Hague only handles cases between states. The Rome Statute emphasizes that, “without an international criminal court for dealing with individual responsibility as an enforcement mechanism, acts of genocide and egregious violations of human rights often go unpunished.
 
Human Rights Watch published a report in 2002 describing Indonesian efforts to convict war criminals as a “sham.” These criminals have not been brought to justice for their crimes committed in the violence following a Timorese vote for independence in 1999.
 
According to HRW, there has been:
1.      Failure of prosecution
2.      Limited geographical and temporal jurisdiction
3.      Inadequate witness protection
4.      Questionable selection of judges; inadequate judicial training
5.      History of light punishment for members of the security forces
6.      Insufficient number of trial judges; non-functioning court of appeals
7.      Inadequate trial transcripts and translation devices
8.      Lack of support services and resources for judges
9.      Inadequate professional training for the judiciary
10. Indonesia’s unwillingness to cooperate with the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU)
 

 

 
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Debate

President Obama has resumed talks with his Indonesian counterpart Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono concerning joint-training programs for Indonesian military units. Kopassus, one of the units in question, has been linked to war crimes. This would lift a 12-year old ban on such operations. The US will only do so if the Indonesian government is actively committed to bringing those guilty of war crimes to justice. However, will it begin training as soon as the agreements are signed or will it wait until alleged suspects are convicted. The US on its part plans on training younger soldiers who could not have, because of their age, taken part in the atrocious acts themselves.

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Past Ambassadors

Note: The United States established diplomatic relations with East Timor and opened Embassy Dili on May 20, 2002. Shari Villarosa served as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim May-Dec 2002.

 
Grover Joseph Rees, 3rd
Appointment: Nov 15, 2002
Presentation of Credentials: Dec 10, 2002
Termination of Mission: Left post, Sep 29, 2006
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Timor-Leste's Ambassador to the U.S.
ambassador-image Alves, Domingos Sarmento

 

Domingos Sarmento Alves was installed as ambassador from the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on May 21, 2014. It’s the second ambassadorial post for Alves.

 

Alves has a bachelor’s degree in labor and organizational psychology with graduate studies in ASEAN and European Union institutions in Portugal. He made his name during student protests urging independence for Timor-Leste (East Timor) in the mid-1990s. The former Portuguese colony declared its independence in 1975, but forces from neighboring Indonesia rolled through the territory and the Jakarta government declared it to be the country’s 27th province.

 

Alves was the spokesman for RENTIL, the National Resistance of Students of Timor-Leste, during that group’s 12-day sit-in at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in 1994, which coincided with a visit from President Bill Clinton. Alves and 28 other protestors were granted political asylum in Portugal. He told a BBC interviewer: “If [the Indonesians] will apply the concepts of human rights and to fight for the rightness of human rights in the world, I think it will be possible to establish peace in East Timor.” He got his wish five years later, when Indonesia gave up control of Timor-Leste, and in 2002 it was declared a sovereign nation.

 

In 2000, Alves helped found the Democratic Party, which is now part of Timor-Leste’s governing coalition.

 

Alves has been acting chief of protocol to the president, acting director of bilateral relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international relations advisor to the president. In 2006, he was named his country’s ambassador to Japan, a post he held until 2012. Prior to being sent to Washington, Alves was political advisor to the vice minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

 

Alves and his wife, Odete Genoveva Victor da Costa, have a daughter, Benedita. He speaks Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese, English and some Spanish.

-Steve Straehley

 

To Learn More:

Official Biography

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Timor-Leste's Embassy Web Site in the U.S.
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U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste

Stanton, Clark
ambassador-image

The new nation of Timor-Leste—in existence only since 2002—will soon have a new U.S. ambassador to deal with. Nominated July 31, Karen Clark Stanton has been executive director in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs since 2009. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved her nomination on Halloween, a threat by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) to hold up all executive nominations until additional witnesses to the terror attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, testify, could delay final approval.

 

Born circa the 1960s, Karen Clark Stanton earned a B.A. at the University of Michigan and an M.S.S. at the National War College in 2000, where she wrote a paper on “Controlling Weapons of Mere Destruction.”

 

After joining the Foreign Service, Stanton served early career foreign postings as a consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China, from 1987 to 1990 and at the embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1991 to 1993. Continuing her work in the consular field, Stanton served as a consular officer in the Visa Office in the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the State Department in Washington, D.C. from 1993 to 1995. 

 

Back on the road, she served as a personnel officer at the embassy in Beijing, from 1995 to 1998, and after taking time to earn her M.S.S. at the National War College in 2000, she was an assignments officer in the Bureau of Human Resources in 2001. 

 

Stanton was the supervisory post management officer in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2001 to 2004, and a management counselor at the embassy in Singapore from 2004 to 2008. 

 

From 2008 to 2009, Stanton was the deputy executive director in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, rising to executive director in 2009. 

 

Karen Clark Stanton is married to William Stanton, a retired Foreign Service officer who served as director of the Taipei office of the American Institute in Taiwan from 2009 to 2012. They have two daughters, Katherine and Elizabeth.

-Matt Bewig

 

Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (pdf)

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Previous U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste

Klemm, Hans
ambassador-image

Hans G. Klemm served as the US Ambassador to East Timor from June 2007 until May 25, 2010. Klemm has worked as director of the Office of Career Development and Assignments in the Bureau of Human Resources of the State Department, and as director of the Office of Agriculture, Biotechnology and Textile Trade Affairs in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.

 
Overseas, Klemm worked at US embassies in Bonn, Seoul and Port of Spain. In his foreign and domestic assignments, he has had responsibility for a broad range of management and international economic policy issues, including bilateral and multilateral trade, international finance and development, international organization affairs, and civil aviation.
 
He has also served as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs at the US Embassy in Tokyo.
 

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News
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Overview

Timor-Leste is situated on the eastern half of the island of Timor, located in the Lesser Sunda Islands of Indonesia in South East Asia. The Dutch and the Portuguese established trading bases in Timor, which was originally occupied by Australasian migrants. Conflict between the two European countries between 1642 and 1906 culminated in the establishment of present-day boundaries and shared power. Timor experienced general instability during and after World War II. Japan occupied it during the war, followed by Portugal. The 1974 coup in Portugal forced it to decolonize Timor. Efforts were now underway to stabilize the newly decolonized territory, but were unsuccessful given the feud between the major political parties. Indonesia took advantage of this situation and invaded in 1975. Backed by the United States government under the Gerald Ford administration, the Indonesian government took control of the land and in the process eliminated hundreds of thousands of Timorese through starvation and violence.

International solidarity movements were growing, while the US continued to sell arms to Indonesia. In 1999, President Bill Clinton severed all ties and President Suharto of Indonesia was forced out to be replaced by his Vice President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie.
 
Habibie gave the Timorese the option of either becoming part of Indonesia or independent. The voters chose independence and were met with a full scale military incursion. Thousands died or were displaced until violence was ended by an Australian military intervention in 1999.
 
Timor-Leste became an independent republic in May 2002, with Xanana Gusmao as president, and it joined the United Nations in September of that year. Violence has continued to plague Timor-Leste since then. In April 2006, unrest in Dili resulted in widespread rioting, with more than 600 soldiers deserting their barracks. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri called the violence a “coup” and asked for international assistance.. Australia, Portugal, New Zealand and Malaysia deployed troops to help quell the violence.
 
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Basic Information

Lay of the Land: The Democratic Republic of East Timor occupies the eastern half of the island of Timor, in Indonesia’s Lesser Sunda Islands, plus the enclave of Ocussi on the northern coast of west Timor.

 
Population: 1.1 million
 
Religions: Catholic 98%, Protestant 1%, Muslim 1%.
 
Ethnic Groups: Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Papuan, small Chinese minority.
 
Languages: Mambae 8.0%, Makaae 7.0%, Tukudede 6.3%, Tetun (official) 5.0%, Tetun Dili 5.0%, Kemak 5.0%, Bunak 5.0%, Galoli 5.0%, IFaltaluku 3.0%, Baikeno 2.0%, Idaté 0.5%, Portuguese (official). There are 19 living languages in East Timor.
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History

The island of Timor was originally settled as the result of Australasian migration from 40,000-20,000 BC. Its people came from Sri Lanka, Australia and Indonesia, as well as China and Indo-China.

 
Early settlers did not have much contact with the outside world, except when seafaring traders from China and India visited. In the early 16th century, Portuguese and Dutch traders established contact with Timor, setting up a spice trade, as well as missions. East Timor has been largely neglected regarding investment in its development and primarily used as a trading post by the various colonial powers. In 1642, the Portuguese moved into Timor, coming into conflict with the Dutch, who had settled the western end of the island.
 
In 1906, East Timor’s present-day boundaries were established, with the two colonial powers sharing the island. From 1942-1945, Japan occupied all of Timor, but Portugal resumed colonial authority over East Timor in 1945, after the Japanese were defeated by the allies.
 
In 1974, a military coup in Lisbon, Portugal forced a rapid and disorganized decolonization period in East Timor. Political tensions on the island heated up on August 11, 1975, and the Timorese Democratic Union Party (UDT) launched a coup d’état in Dili. This was followed by a brief but bloody civil war, in which the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) pushed UDT forces into Indonesian West Timor.
 
FRETILIN claimed victory in late September of that year, while Indonesian forces began incursions into East Timor. On October 16, five journalists from Australia, Britain, and New Zealand were murdered in the East Timorese town of Balibo shortly after they had filmed regular Indonesian army troops invading East Timorese territory.
 
On November 28, FRETILIN declared East Timor an independent state, and Indonesia responded by launching a full-scale military invasion on December 7. The attack, dubbed “Operation Komodo” by the Indonesian military, not only involved military equipment provided by the United States, but the administration of President Gerald Ford secretly ”okayed” the operation with President Suharto of Indonesia. On December 22, 1975, the UN Security Council called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor, but it refused.
 
On January 13, 1976, an Indonesian-backed puppet provisional government was established in East Timor to prevent the consolidation of power by the FRETILIN party. The Indonesians claimed that FRETILIN was a communist party, even though the party’s leadership claimed it was social democratic. However, claims made by the Indonesians were accepted in the West, and major international powers had little incentive to confront Indonesia.
 
Meanwhile, support among the East Timorese for the guerilla resistance increased, indicating that the Indonesian presence was not welcome, and the Indonesian occupation was never given official recognition by the United Nations.
 
On May 31, 1976, a “Peoples Assembly” in Dili endorsed an Act of Integration. On July 17, East Timor became the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian occupation was characterized by brutal military repression. Beginning in the late 1980s, the occupation was increasingly characterized by programs to win the “hearts-and-minds” of the Timorese through the use of economic development assistance and job creation. But serious human rights violations continued. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 Timorese lost their lives to violence and hunger during this period.
 
On November 12, 1991, the Dili Massacre occurred, and became a turning point. This led the US to cut off funding for Indonesian military personnel. But the US continued to sell arms to Indonesia’s government, led by President Suharto, until President Bill Clinton cut off all US military ties in 1999. The Australian government followed suit that same year. A burgeoning pro-independence movement grew among the East Timorese along with growing solidarity movements in Portugal, Australia and the United States.
 
In the mid-1990s, the pro-democracy People’s Democratic Party (PRD) in Indonesia called for withdrawal from East Timor. The party’s leadership was arrested in July 1996. In July 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela called upon Suharto to free the imprisoned Xanana Gusmão. Instead, Suharto said he would take three months off Gusmão’s two-year sentence.
 
The following year, Suharto finally stepped down after a dictatorial reign that lasted four decades. On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced his government’s plan to allow the people of East Timor to choose between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. Under an agreement brokered by the United Nations, a referendum was held in East Timor on August 30, 1999—with 78% voting for independence. In response, Timorese militias supported by the Indonesian military (TNI) launched a full-scale campaign of retribution.
 
Pro-independence FALINTIL guerillas remained cantoned in UN-supervised camps while the TNI killed approximately 1,300 Timorese, and forcibly relocated 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly all of the country’s electrical grid, were destroyed.
 
On September 20, 1999, Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) were deployed, bringing an end to the violence. Activists in Portugal, Australia and the United States pressured their governments to take action and President Bill Clinton threatened Indonesia with the withdrawal of IMF loans. Indonesia agreed to withdraw its troops and allow multinational forces into East Timor to stabilize the area. The UN also authorized the creation of a multinational military force known as INTERFET (International Force for East Timor).
 
Timor-Leste became a fully independent republic with a parliamentary form of government on May 20, 2002, following two and a half years under the authority of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In August 2001, the country chose its first parliament, in the country’s first free and fair elections. FRETILIN won the majority of seats, and Mari Alkatiri, FRETILIN’s secretary general, became the first prime minister. 
 
On April 14, 2002, Xanana Gusmao was elected president, and East Timor became a member of the UN on September 27. UNTAET’s mandate ended with East Timor’s independence, but a successor organization, the UN Mission for the Support of East Timor (UNMISET), was established to provide additional support to the government. UNMISET’s mandate expired on May 20, 2005 after the UN Security Council unanimously approved the creation of a small special political mission in Timor-Leste. The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) took its place.
 
In April 2006, Dili experienced rioting in support of 600 East Timorese soldiers who were dismissed for deserting their barracks. In the resulting violence, five people were killed, and 20,000 fled their homes. Additional violence, between government forces and Falintil troops, broke out later that year as a result of the unfair distribution of funds from oil production on the seabed area between East Timor, Indonesia and Australia. This area has been highly contested by all parties claiming sovereign right to the profits generated. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri called the violence a “coup” and welcomed offers of foreign military assistance from several nations. On May 25, 2006, military personnel from Australia, Portugal, New Zealand and Malaysia deployed to East Timor to quell the violence.
 
On June 21, 2006, President Gusmao formally requested Prime Minister Alkatiri step down. FRETILIN party members accused him of lying about distributing weapons to civilians. Alkatiri resigned on June 26, 2006. Gusmao appointed José Ramos-Horta as Alkatiris’ successor. In April 2007 violence broke out in the run-up to the election due to political divide. President Gusmao declined to run for another term.
 
The results of the 2007 presidential election came after two rounds of voting. The first round eliminated 6 out of the 8 candidates. The two remaining, José Ramos-Horta took 21.81% of the votes as an independent and Francisco Guterrez took 27.89% as a member of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. (FREITLIN) The second round of voting showed Ramos-Horta win 69.18% of the votes and Guterrez 30.82% of the votes. Both rounds had more or less the same amount of people votes with 403,941 for the first round and 413,177 in the second.
 
Violence and instability made up the backdrop of the election. Different political factions were fighting for power with the support of different security forces, Violence between police and army units caused widespread gang violence. Much of the instability was due to the rebel Alfredo Reinado. Reinado was trained by Australian forces and at one point was the head of the East Timor military. After watching some of his fellow soldiers fire upon a group of demonstrators in Dili, he decided to leave his barracks. As the head of a rebel group, he was involved in riots against the established government and promised to die for his country. In spite of the violence, Ramos-Horta was sworn in as president, with Gusmao taking the position of prime minister. In February 2008, President Ramos-Horta was critically injured in an assassination attempt led by the rogue soldier, Alfredo Reinado, who was killed by the Timor Leste Defense Force. (F-FDTL) Gusmao was also attacked during the failed coup, but managed to escape unscathed. The violence in the run up to the election culminated with 37 dead and more than 150,000 displaced, at which point Australian forces intervened. Australia has remained in the country in the face of formal requests from the Timorese country for assistance. They maintain 400 military personnel under Operation ASTUTE.
 
Timor (Wikipedia)
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Timor-Leste's Newspapers
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History of U.S. Relations with Timor-Leste

The years of the Cold War were of much concern to the United States. The US government feared the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia and viewed it as a national security threat. Thus, when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, the US government—unlike others in the international community—did not object to the military action, given that the Indonesian government led by Suharto was in effect combating communism. In fact, as the years wore on, it was revealed that the administration of President Gerald Ford, which included Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, approved the invasion. While the international community protested, the US government doubled military aid to Indonesia and prevented the United Nations from taking effective action against the country. During this period, US relations with East Timor were highly influenced by its relations with Indonesia. Because the US was engaged in a Cold War against communism, foreign government had only to claim they were fighting communism to gain US support. This is what the Indonesian military did and successfully won over President Gerald Ford, who aided and approved the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. Much of the Indonesian military’s weaponry was supplied by the US. These weapons were supposedly to be used only in the act of self-defense. The brutal and violent tactics used by the Indonesian military caused an outcry from human rights organizations around the world. Human rights groups in the US were responsible for pressuring Congress into acknowledging and ultimately cutting ties with the Indonesian government over human rights abuses. The U.S. Congress contemplated cutting all aid, including World Bank loans, to Indonesia. In the face of such opposition and the possible elimination of a major source of money, the Indonesian military finally withdrew all of its forces from East Timor by the October 31, 1999. An international peacekeeping force made up of UN peacekeeping forces led by Australia was established to maintain order until power could be turned over to an independent East Timor government body.

 
 
The United States continued to provide grant aid training to Indonesia under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program until 1992, when Congress finally cut the aid as a reaction to the human rights situation in East Timor. This restriction was partially lifted in 1995. Military assistance programs were again suspended, however, in the aftermath of the violence and destruction in East Timor following the August 30, 1999, referendum favoring independence. Given that independence was favored among the Timorese, the Indonesian military again intervened with violent tactics. It was at this point that the US completely severed ties with Indonesia, including cutting off loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
 
The United States established diplomatic relations with Timor-Leste on May 20, 2002.
 
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Current U.S. Relations with Timor-Leste

The United States Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Forty base at Camp Lenhoff in the capital Dilli serves as a base for the navy’s Seabees. Seabees is a branch of the navy which is comprised mainly of civil engineers and personnel with other construction skills whose purpose is to provide improvements in infrastructure wherever they are based. According to the US embassy in East Timor, the Seabees purpose in East Timor is to “coordinate with the Timor-Leste Government and other international partners on infrastructure project development in order to improve essential infrastructure, service capabilities, and foster goodwill. They have completed 14 projects, including a medical clinic in Osso Huna, a market building in Baucau, and a soccer stadium in Gleno.” They have also provided improvements to the cities university.

 
In late 2009, the US military conducted joint-training exercises with the Timor Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) as well as various humanitarian tasks. In the 10-week exercise, US Marines and the navy will be repairing schools and opening free dental and medical clinics throughout East Timor. Their purpose is to improve the welfare of the Timorese people but also to improve and expand cooperation between the US and East Timor.
 
According to the US ambassador to East Timor Hans Klemm, “the fundamental objective of our interaction is a stable Timor-Leste better able to provide for its own defense and capable of contributing positively to regional security.” To this end, US military involvement has included improving the Timorese military’s professionalism and capacity in providing security and stability. It has therefore seen fit to develop close relationships with both key security institutions and civilian institutions to improve their overall functioning.
The Indonesian government is currently urging the Obama administration to resume joint-training of military units accused of committing human rights abuses during its incursion into East Timor. However, they do not want to force any deal with strings attached. They want the U.S. to willingly resume its former operations in conjunction with the Indonesian government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
 
In 2006, seven Timorese visited the US. The number of Timorese traveling to the US has stayed below 30 since 2002.
 
The Pitfalls of UN Nation-building (by Robert McMahon, Council on Foreign Relations)
 
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Where Does the Money Flow

Commerce between the US and Timor-Leste is very small. In 2009, US imports totaled $66,000 and exports $2.4 million. The largest exports were material handlings equipment ($321,000), civilian aircraft, engines, equipment and parts ($320,000), industrial machines ($191,000), telecommunications equipment ($188,000) and sports apparel and gear ($152,000).

 
The US also contributes funds to a number of multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, which assist the island nation. Aid from the US to Timor-Leste totaled $273 million from 2000-2008.
 
The U.S. Congressional Budget for Foreign Operations requested $14.6 million in total aid for East Timor in 2010. This fell by $9.7 million from the amount spent in 2009.The 2010 budget allotted the funds to development aid ($10.3 million), Global Health and Child Survival- USAID ($2 million), Foreign Military Financing ($1 million), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement ($860,000) and International Military Education and Training ($400,000).
 
Key Interest Areas in East Timor 2010
Microenterprise- $2.5 million
Agriculture and related Programs – $1.7 million
Family Planning and Reproductive Health- $1 million
Maternal and Child Health- $1 million
Trade Capacity Building- $1 million
 
The US government is primarily concerned with aiding East Timor’s transition to a stable democracy with a free and open economy. It has thus invested in 4 different sectors: Peace and Security ($1.6 million), Governing Justly and Democratically ($5.4 million), Economic Growth ($5.5 million) and People ($2 million).
 
The first sector is responsible for modernizing and improving efficiency and professionalism in both the police and the military. The instability that has plagued the country for decades has called for reform in both its police force and the judicial system. An American Resident Legal Advisor will be charged with aiding in this reform.
 
According to the US State Department, the second sector is charged with strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as reducing corruption and rewarding good governance and strengthening civil society. USAID support is mainly concerned with strengthening the countries criminal Justice institutions. It will focus on improving the Office of the Prosecutor-General. In order to keep this institution in check, USAID will also attempt to improve civil society’s ability to monitor the system’s administration of justice. This includes enhancing the freedom of the press and local organizations.
 
According to the US State Department, the third sector aims at promoting economic growth by pushing private sector competitiveness to enhance innovation and efficiency. It is also aiding the development of the agricultural sector and creating economic opportunities for the population. This will require the development of a land titling and registration system. This will prevent conflict and facilitate land development through private investment. The agricultural sector will need major improvements if there are to be improved or new economic opportunities given that 85% of the population is engaged in this sector.
 
According to the US State Department, the fourth sector will be responsible for allocating the funds in health improvement related programs. “USAID programs will continue to address Timor-Leste’s appalling health statistics through maternal and child health interventions, such as immunization for vaccine-preventable childhood diseases; improved nutrition and micronutrient care; malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia prevention and treatment programs, including water, sanitation and hygiene promotion; and child spacing.”
 
Timor-Leste (Office of the United States Trade Representative)
Timor-Leste (USAID)
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Controversies

President Obama Considers Resuming Joint-Training of Indonesian Forces Linked to Atrocities in East Timor.

In 2010, President Obama was scheduled to visit Indonesia to sign pending agreements including the revocation of a U.S. ban on aid to military groups with a history of human rights abuses like “Kopassus.” According to The Washington Post, the U.S. will not support any military units with this kind of history unless the Timorese government is attempting to bring those guilty to justice. Obama’s strategy is to approach younger soldiers in the unit who could not have taken part in the atrocities because of their age.
 
Obama’s Intelligence Chief Ignored Orders Regarding East Timor
Before joining the Obama administration as Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair’s last job in the military was a three-year stint as commander-in-chief of United States Pacific Command, the highest ranking officer over all US forces in the Asia-Pacific region. While serving in this command, Blair reportedly disobeyed orders from the Clinton administration during the 1999 East Timorese crisis. Amid growing violence against the independence movement in Indonesian-occupied East Timor, Blair was ordered to meet with General Wiranto, commander of the Indonesian military, to tell him to shut down the pro-Indonesia militia. The admiral failed to deliver this message during his meeting with Wiranto, and instead gave the Indonesian general an offer of military assistance and a personal invitation to be Blair’s guest in Hawaii. Months later, after killings of independence supporters had grown, Blair was sent back to Indonesia and, following civilian orders, cut off all American ties to the Indonesian military.
The Bloody Career of Admiral Dennis C. Blair (by Bradley Simpson, Uruknet.info)
Blair Is Steeped in the Ways Intelligence Works (by Dana Priest, Washington Post)
 
US Military Trains Indonesian Special Ops with Dark Past
In 2007, the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) strongly condemned American training for two Indonesian military units. ETAN urged the US Congress to intervene to prevent such training and called on the Bush administration to publicly pledge not to provide further assistance to the two units. The units in question were Kopassus, an Indonesian Special Forces unit with a long record of human rights violations, and Brimob, a para-military mobile police brigade. Dr. Damien Kingsbury, an Australian expert on the Indonesian military, has written that “Kopassus has murdered and tortured political activists, trade unionists and human rights workers. It has also trained, equipped and led militias in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, and Kopassus members trained the notorious Laskar Jihad Islamic militia, which stepped up conflict in the Ambon region, leaving up to 10,000 dead.”
 
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Human Rights

 

According to the US State Department, “International security forces in the country included the UN Police (UNPOL) within the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the International Stabilization Force (ISF), neither of which was under the direct control of the government. The national security forces are the National Police (PNTL) and Defense Forces (F-FDTL). While the government generally maintained control over these forces, there were problems with discipline and accountability.”
 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and other national leaders publicly acknowledged the extent of official corruption. The law provides for criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices. The country does not have financial disclosure laws. Gusmão required that all cabinet officials in his government complete financial disclosure documents, but by the end of 2008 none had done so.
 
The most serious human rights issues are those that involve the Timorese security forces. According to the State Department, the most common include “police use of excessive force during arrest and abuse of authority; perception of impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention; and an inefficient and understaffed judiciary that deprived citizens of due process and an expeditious and fair trial. Domestic violence, rape, and sexual abuse were also problems.
 
The aforementioned PNTL and the F-FDTL lack efficiency and professionalism and therefore make it difficult to uphold the rule of law. US cooperation hopes to improve in these areas through joint-training programs.
 
According to the State Department, “there were incidents of cruel or degrading treatment of civilians by police and military personnel.” Members of Parliament, NGOs, the UN, and the Office of the Ombudsman received numerous complaints of use of excessive force by personnel of the Joint Command or National Police (PNTL) during the state of emergency. The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste’s (UNMIT) human rights unit and NGOs received numerous complaints of excessive force and degrading treatment by the Dili Task Force, a rapid reaction police unit created in December 2007.
According to the US State Department, Sample Cases against the security forces included:
 
February to May 2008- “Ombudsman’s office investigated 40 cases of mistreatment committed by PNTL or F-FDTL personnel during the state of siege.”
November 2008- “Two police officers accused of the assault of a woman. They were sentenced to two and six months’ suspended imprisonment, the two remained on active duty.”
June 7, 2009- “F-FDTL personnel beat two civilians and reportedly pointed their weapons at      UNPOL members after breaking up a fight between two martial arts groups.”
            June 2009- “F-FDTL member allegedly threatened and beat a residential security guard.”
September 26, 2009- “A group of F-FDTL members physically assaulted a Timorese woman and two foreign military personnel.”
 
The PNTL as an institution remained poorly equipped and under-trained, subject to numerous credible allegations of abuse of authority, mishandling of firearms, and corruption. Some police officers did not pass the vetting process and were on suspension pending further investigation.
 
There were reports of arbitrary interference with privacy and home. During the state of emergency, there were at least three instances in which the PNTL or Joint Command carried out searches without warrants.
 
“UNMIT personnel noted allegations of mistreatment of detainees by prison guards during the first 72 hours of imprisonment and a lack of special facilities for the mentally ill, who consequently were detained along with other prisoners.” Police station detention cells generally did not comply with international standards and lacked sanitation facilities and bedding.
 
According to Human Rights Watch, the major problem in East Timor is impunity. There have been many cases of excessive use of force by the police. “We were shocked to find so many credible accounts of torture and severe ill-treatment by police officers,” said Brad Adams, Asia director for Human Rights Watch. “East Timor won independence in part because of Indonesia’s horrific record here. Now some people are saying that the new police force is no better than the old one, and this should worry the government.”
According to HRW, “police and other state institutions in East Timor also regularly fail to respond appropriately to incidents of police abuse. The main internal police oversight body, the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit (PEDU), often fails to take cases of police abuse seriously, to follow up with complaints, or properly discipline the officers involved. Independent bodies that could take up cases of police abuse are ineffective and lack sufficient material or political support to succeed.”
“East Timor’s leaders are ignoring police abuse when they should be taking urgent steps to end it,” said Adams. “The people of East Timor have the right to expect better treatment from their own police force.”
Human Rights Watch also called for,  “international donors to express their concern about police torture to the government of East Timor; substantially increase support for independent monitoring of police violence and for agencies that can provide services for victims; and fund and plan for long-term strategies on capacity-building, training, and other support to the PNTL.”
 
The judicial sector is also inefficient. The system lacks the required number of qualified staff in order to function efficiently. In its present state, there is a major problem of case backlog.
 
Arbitrary arrest and detention occurred in many instances because magistrates or judges were unavailable. The extreme shortage of prosecutors and judges outside of the capital contributed to police inability to obtain required warrants. There was an extreme shortage of qualified public defenders, and many indigent defendants relied on lawyers provided by legal aid organizations. A number of defendants who were assigned public defenders reported that they had never seen their lawyer, and there were concerns that some low priority cases were being delayed indefinitely while suspects remained in pretrial detention.
 
The country’s judicial system faced a wide array of challenges including concerns about the impartiality of some judicial organs, a severe shortage of qualified personnel, a complex and multi-sourced legal regime, and the fact that the majority of the population does not speak Portuguese, the language in which the laws were written and the courts operated.
 
The trial process often was hindered by nonattendance of witnesses due to lack of proper notification or lack of transportation. The shortage of qualified prosecutors and technical staff in the office of the prosecutor general hampered its work.
 
The legal regime is complex and was inconsistently applied. Pending development of a complete set of national laws, Indonesian laws and the UN’s transitional regulations remained in effect. The constitution stipulates that UN regulations supersede Indonesian laws; however, this was inconsistently applied.
 
The Court of Appeals operated primarily in Portuguese. The UN regulations, many of which remained in force, were available in English, Portuguese, Indonesian, and Tetum (the language most widely spoken in the country). Laws enacted by parliament, intended to supplant Indonesian laws and UN regulations, were published in Portuguese but were seldom available in Tetum. Litigants, witnesses, and criminal defendants often were unable to read the new laws. Trials are required to be conducted in Portuguese and Tetum. However, the quality of translation provided in court varied widely, and translations into Tetum were often incomplete summaries. The prevalence of other local languages compounded this problem in the districts, particularly in Oecussi.
 
As in previous years, concerns arose in 2008 over the lack of witness-protection arrangements. In many violent crimes, witnesses were unwilling to testify because of the high potential for retribution against themselves or their families. Court personnel also reported increased concern regarding their own safety.
 
The law stipulates that all legislation, Supreme Court decisions (when the court is established), and decisions made by government bodies must be published in the official gazette. If not published, they are null and void. Regulations also provide for public access to court proceedings and decisions and the national budget and accounts. In practice there were concerns that public access to information was constrained. For example, the official gazette was published only in Portuguese, although by law it is to be published in Tetum as well. Moreover, its irregular publishing schedule and varying cost meant that few journalists, public servants, or others had regular access to it or knew how to access it.
 
The government suspended freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate during the state of emergency. There were credible reports that, following the February 11 attacks, members of the Joint Command explicitly warned villagers in Ermera against making human rights complaints.
 
Violence against women was a problem, and discrimination against women, persons with disabilities, and members of minority groups occurred. Outside of the capital, non-Catholic religious groups were at times regarded with suspicion. There were reports that Catholics who converted to other religions were subjected to harassment and abuse by community members. Gender-based violence remained a serious concern. Although rape is a crime, failures to investigate or prosecute cases of alleged rape and sexual abuse were common as were long delays.
 
Delay or refusal by police to investigate allegations of rape or domestic violence was a common problem.
Domestic violence against women was a significant problem often exacerbated by the reluctance of authorities to respond aggressively. Police also at times came under pressure from community members to ignore cases of domestic violence or sexual abuse.
 
Government regulations prohibit persons from organizing prostitution. However, under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Indonesian laws, prostitution is not illegal. Nonetheless, in past years there were reports of women being arrested for prostitution.
 
There was no law prohibiting sexual harassment, and sexual harassment was reportedly widespread, particularly within some government ministries and the police.
 
Some customary practices discriminate against women. For example, in some regions or villages where traditional practices hold sway, women may not inherit or own property. Traditional cultural practices such as payment of a bride price and occasionally polyandry also occurred.
 
In rural areas heavily indebted parents sometimes provided their children as indentured servants as a way to settle the debt. If the child was a girl, the receiving family may also demand any dowry payment normally owed to the girl’s parents.
 
Violence against children and child sexual assault was a significant problem. Some commercial sexual exploitation of minors occurred.
 
Thousands of children remained at risk due to their continued displacement. The capacity of the state, communities, and families to protect children was seriously challenged. Incidents of child abuse, including sexual abuse, were reported both inside and outside the IDP camps. Underreporting of child abuse was a problem.
 
In many districts children with disabilities were unable to attend school due to accessibility problems. During the year some persons with mental disabilities faced discriminatory or degrading treatment due in part to a lack of appropriate treatment resources or lack of referral to existing resources. Mentally ill persons were imprisoned with the general prison population and were denied needed psychiatric care.
 
According to Amnesty International, there are cases of forced labor in Malaysia that originate from Timor-Leste. Ramos, a 25-year-old plantation worker in Malaysia from Timor-Leste said, “Some workers did not know precisely how much was deducted from their wages.”He also stated that workers are often abused and mistakenly arrested by RELA, Malaysia People’s Volunteer Corps which is charged with preserving national security.
 
Following a meeting between President José Ramos –Horta and Amnesty International’s Secretary General, Claudio Cordone, a letter was issued for the president with regard to the meeting’s issues. According to the letter, “Amnesty International addressed the role of criminal justice in dealing with the crimes of the past in Timor-Leste, including the proposal to set up an international tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed during Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste between 1975 and 1999.”
 
According to Amnesty International, President Ramos-Horta has long objected such a tribunal but has stated that he will not oppose it if the international Security Council decided to establish it. On its part, Amnesty International has adamantly established its firm belief in the importance of the public’s confidence in the rule of law. The level of impunity seen during the Indonesian occupation can weaken such confidence and leave the system open to instability. The tribunal would act as an impartial external arbiter of the law and help curb corruption and improve on the national courts inability to address its responsibilities adequately.
 
The tribunal hopes not to enforce prosecutions in Timor-Leste for the crimes during the occupation but would do it in Indonesia as well as long as they are willing to cooperate. Amnesty International suggested these steps are only part of a long-run process aimed at addressing impunity.
 
Amnesty International also wrote a letter to all members of the UN Security Council urging it “to take immediate steps to address the continuing lack of accountability for crimes against humanity and other grave human rights violations which occurred in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) under Indonesia’s occupation.” This was a plea to renew the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).
 
According to the International Criminal Court, “Timor-Leste acceded to the Rome Statute on 6 September 2002, becoming the 79th State Party.” According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the aim of this is to achieve international Peace and Justice. Its aims are expanding justice for all, end impunity, help end conflicts, remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, take over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act, and to deter future war criminals. The current International Court of Justice at The Hague only handles cases between states. The Rome Statute emphasizes that, “without an international criminal court for dealing with individual responsibility as an enforcement mechanism, acts of genocide and egregious violations of human rights often go unpunished.
 
Human Rights Watch published a report in 2002 describing Indonesian efforts to convict war criminals as a “sham.” These criminals have not been brought to justice for their crimes committed in the violence following a Timorese vote for independence in 1999.
 
According to HRW, there has been:
1.      Failure of prosecution
2.      Limited geographical and temporal jurisdiction
3.      Inadequate witness protection
4.      Questionable selection of judges; inadequate judicial training
5.      History of light punishment for members of the security forces
6.      Insufficient number of trial judges; non-functioning court of appeals
7.      Inadequate trial transcripts and translation devices
8.      Lack of support services and resources for judges
9.      Inadequate professional training for the judiciary
10. Indonesia’s unwillingness to cooperate with the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU)
 

 

 
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Debate

President Obama has resumed talks with his Indonesian counterpart Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono concerning joint-training programs for Indonesian military units. Kopassus, one of the units in question, has been linked to war crimes. This would lift a 12-year old ban on such operations. The US will only do so if the Indonesian government is actively committed to bringing those guilty of war crimes to justice. However, will it begin training as soon as the agreements are signed or will it wait until alleged suspects are convicted. The US on its part plans on training younger soldiers who could not have, because of their age, taken part in the atrocious acts themselves.

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Past Ambassadors

Note: The United States established diplomatic relations with East Timor and opened Embassy Dili on May 20, 2002. Shari Villarosa served as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim May-Dec 2002.

 
Grover Joseph Rees, 3rd
Appointment: Nov 15, 2002
Presentation of Credentials: Dec 10, 2002
Termination of Mission: Left post, Sep 29, 2006
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Timor-Leste's Ambassador to the U.S.
ambassador-image Alves, Domingos Sarmento

 

Domingos Sarmento Alves was installed as ambassador from the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on May 21, 2014. It’s the second ambassadorial post for Alves.

 

Alves has a bachelor’s degree in labor and organizational psychology with graduate studies in ASEAN and European Union institutions in Portugal. He made his name during student protests urging independence for Timor-Leste (East Timor) in the mid-1990s. The former Portuguese colony declared its independence in 1975, but forces from neighboring Indonesia rolled through the territory and the Jakarta government declared it to be the country’s 27th province.

 

Alves was the spokesman for RENTIL, the National Resistance of Students of Timor-Leste, during that group’s 12-day sit-in at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in 1994, which coincided with a visit from President Bill Clinton. Alves and 28 other protestors were granted political asylum in Portugal. He told a BBC interviewer: “If [the Indonesians] will apply the concepts of human rights and to fight for the rightness of human rights in the world, I think it will be possible to establish peace in East Timor.” He got his wish five years later, when Indonesia gave up control of Timor-Leste, and in 2002 it was declared a sovereign nation.

 

In 2000, Alves helped found the Democratic Party, which is now part of Timor-Leste’s governing coalition.

 

Alves has been acting chief of protocol to the president, acting director of bilateral relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international relations advisor to the president. In 2006, he was named his country’s ambassador to Japan, a post he held until 2012. Prior to being sent to Washington, Alves was political advisor to the vice minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

 

Alves and his wife, Odete Genoveva Victor da Costa, have a daughter, Benedita. He speaks Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese, English and some Spanish.

-Steve Straehley

 

To Learn More:

Official Biography

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Timor-Leste's Embassy Web Site in the U.S.
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U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste

Stanton, Clark
ambassador-image

The new nation of Timor-Leste—in existence only since 2002—will soon have a new U.S. ambassador to deal with. Nominated July 31, Karen Clark Stanton has been executive director in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs since 2009. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved her nomination on Halloween, a threat by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) to hold up all executive nominations until additional witnesses to the terror attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, testify, could delay final approval.

 

Born circa the 1960s, Karen Clark Stanton earned a B.A. at the University of Michigan and an M.S.S. at the National War College in 2000, where she wrote a paper on “Controlling Weapons of Mere Destruction.”

 

After joining the Foreign Service, Stanton served early career foreign postings as a consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China, from 1987 to 1990 and at the embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1991 to 1993. Continuing her work in the consular field, Stanton served as a consular officer in the Visa Office in the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the State Department in Washington, D.C. from 1993 to 1995. 

 

Back on the road, she served as a personnel officer at the embassy in Beijing, from 1995 to 1998, and after taking time to earn her M.S.S. at the National War College in 2000, she was an assignments officer in the Bureau of Human Resources in 2001. 

 

Stanton was the supervisory post management officer in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2001 to 2004, and a management counselor at the embassy in Singapore from 2004 to 2008. 

 

From 2008 to 2009, Stanton was the deputy executive director in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, rising to executive director in 2009. 

 

Karen Clark Stanton is married to William Stanton, a retired Foreign Service officer who served as director of the Taipei office of the American Institute in Taiwan from 2009 to 2012. They have two daughters, Katherine and Elizabeth.

-Matt Bewig

 

Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (pdf)

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Previous U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste

Klemm, Hans
ambassador-image

Hans G. Klemm served as the US Ambassador to East Timor from June 2007 until May 25, 2010. Klemm has worked as director of the Office of Career Development and Assignments in the Bureau of Human Resources of the State Department, and as director of the Office of Agriculture, Biotechnology and Textile Trade Affairs in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.

 
Overseas, Klemm worked at US embassies in Bonn, Seoul and Port of Spain. In his foreign and domestic assignments, he has had responsibility for a broad range of management and international economic policy issues, including bilateral and multilateral trade, international finance and development, international organization affairs, and civil aviation.
 
He has also served as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs at the US Embassy in Tokyo.
 

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