Created in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the top intelligence official in the United States government. The DNI oversees what is known as the Intelligence Community, which consists of more than a dozen civilian and military agencies that collect information on threats against the United States. The 16 agencies include Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency and Navy Intelligence.
Prior to the creation of the DNI, the top intelligence official was the Director of Central Intelligence, best known as the head of the CIA. But the massive security failure that allowed terrorists to hijack airliners and crash them into New York and Washington, DC, provoked such outrage that the Director of Central Intelligence lost its top place in the intelligence pecking order to the newly established DNI. The new position has struggled with its own controversies during its short tenure.
Before there was a Director of National Intelligence, the leading intelligence figure in the US government was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI was established in 1947 as part of the National Security Act, which also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), over which the DCI presided. Aside from running the CIA, the DCI reported directly to the President, keeping him informed of any threats to the United States while overseeing all aspects of the nation’s Intelligence Community.
Over the next 50 years, the DCI was largely preoccupied, as were all intelligence-gathering efforts, with the Soviet Union and the ongoing Cold War. The CIA evolved into a highly-secretive and controversial organization, carrying out covert and spying operations throughout the world and sometimes in the US. In the 1970s, the Church Committee exposed years of illegal activities by CIA operatives, which led to federal legislation intended to prevent the CIA or any other government spy agency from conducting clandestine missions in the US unless authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Although the CIA kept out of domestic affairs in the succeeding decade, the agency found itself in hot water again with the Iran-Contra scandal. Then-DCI William Casey was involved in the illegal diversion of arms sales to Contra rebels in Central America, but Casey died before federal investigators could determine how deep his involvement was.
With the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw the CIA lose funding and struggle with its mission now that the Soviet Union was no longer around. As threats from Islamic terrorists began to develop, the agency failed time and again to warn government officials of attacks. These included the 1993 World Trade Center truck bombing, the 1998 twin attacks against US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. But the agency’s biggest, and most costly, intelligence failure was not learning of the plot to hijack American airliners and fly them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In the wake of the attacks, lawmakers demanded answers and authorized a special commission to look into what went wrong. The 9/11 Commission identified major intelligence failures that called into question how well the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community protected US national and homeland security interests against attacks by foreign terrorists.
Soon thereafter, Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Bob Graham (D-FL) introduced legislation to create a Director of National Intelligence. Other intelligence-related reform plans soon followed. After considerable debate, lawmakers passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PDF). Among other things, the law established the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and, in doing so, down-sized the DCI to the head of the CIA and nothing more. The new DNI was now in charge of the Intelligence Community, overseeing all intelligence gathering from civilian and military spy operations.
Some conservatives were not happy with the structure of the new DNI’s responsibilities, arguing that the new director’s powers weren’t strong enough to improve the performance of the Intelligence Community. Although the DNI technically oversaw the work of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, these three spy groups still reported directly to the Secretary of Defense.
When it came time to fill the role of the DNI, President George W. Bush wanted to give the job to former DCI Robert Gates, who served under the President’s father, George H. W. Bush. But Gates declined. Instead, US Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte was nominated and confirmed to serve as the nation’s first Director of National Intelligence. Negroponte served for two years before moving over the State Department. The President then made former NSA Director John Michael McConnell the second DNI.
You Call That a Reform Bill?: The new national intelligence director will be a toothless figurehead.
(by Fred Kaplan, Slate)
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters. The DNI works together with the principal deputy DNI, mission managers and four deputy directors to ensure that timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military commanders and Congress.
According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the DNI also establishes objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production and dissemination of national intelligence, and the director develops an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) based on budget proposals provided by IC component organizations. Overseeing coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of foreign governments and international organizations is another duty of the DNI, as is ensuring the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources to support national security needs. Lastly, the DNI develops personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions, plus it oversees the development and implementation of plans for acquiring major systems that aid in intelligence gathering, doing so jointly with the Secretary of Defense.
There are six basic intelligence sources or collection disciplines utilized by the IC. These are: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); Imagery Intelligence (IMINT); Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT); Human-Source Intelligence (HUMINT); Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT); and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).
Signals intelligence is derived from signals intercepted from all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). The National Security Agency is responsible for collecting, processing and reporting SIGINT. The National SIGINT Committee within NSA advises the director of NSA and the DNI on SIGINT policy issues and manages the SIGINT requirements system.
Imagery Intelligence includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices or other media. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers and electro-optics. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the manager for all imagery intelligence activities, both classified and unclassified, within the government.
Measurement and Signature Intelligence is technically derived intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT. The data results in intelligence that locates, identifies or describes distinctive characteristics of targets. It employs a broad group of disciplines including nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. Examples of this might be the distinctive radar signatures of specific aircraft systems or the chemical composition of air and water samples.
Human intelligence is derived from human sources, or spies. To the public, HUMINT remains synonymous with espionage and clandestine activities; however, most of this collection is performed by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches. It is the oldest method for collecting information and until recently it was the primary source of intelligence. HUMINT is used mainly by the CIA, the Department of State, the DoD and the FBI. Collection includes clandestine acquisition of photography, documents and other material; overt collection by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts; debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad; and official contacts with foreign governments.
Open-Source Intelligence is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, videos, graphics and drawings. While open-source collection responsibilities are broadly distributed through the IC, the major collectors are the DNI’s Open Source Center (OSC) and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).
Geospatial Intelligence is the analysis and visual representation of security related activities on the earth. It is produced through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial information collected from spy satellites.
Created in 2004, the National Counterterrorism Center serves as the clearinghouse and analytic center for information pertaining to international terrorism. Although most of the center’s activities are secret, for the public, the NCTC does provide a database of terror incidents worldwide, called the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System. Incients occurring in the United States can be found here.
DNI Leadership:
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) comprises four directorates, focusing on management, collection, requirements and analysis.
The Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DDNI) for Management helps implement responsibilities related to the administrative management of the IC, strategic planning and coordination and the development and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget. The Deputy Director for Management exercises a number of budgeting, programming, acquisition and personnel authorities and is responsible for the approval of Intelligence Community Directives, instructions and procedural guidance. The DDNI for Management supervises the functions of the chief financial officer, director of strategy, plans and policy, the senior acquisition executive, the IC chief human capital officer, the director for community training and education and the directors of security and administration.
The Deputy Director for Collection coordinates the collection of intelligence data from throughout the Intelligence Community and ensure that the National Intelligence
Strategy (NIS) priorities are appropriately reflected in future planning and systems acquisition decisions. It develops “corporate understanding of needs, requirements and capabilities to ensure that a holistic view is taken on current and future collection systems.” He or she also brings together key IC stakeholders to get senior level insight into issues.
According to the Office of the DNI, the Deputy Director for Requirements is responsible for ensuring decision makers receive timely and actionable information that allows them to fulfill their respective national security missions by articulating, advocating and coordinating requirements within the IC. The Deputy Director for Requirements interfaces with the variety of intelligence customers at the national, state and local level, and he or she provides organizations not traditionally associated with national intelligence a link to information, products and avenues for sharing intelligence
The most well-known of the responsibilities of the Deputy Director for Analysis is the production of the President’s Daily Brief. The DDNI for Analysis also serves concurrently as the chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). According to the Office of the DNI, the Deputy Director for Analysis manages and establishes common policies and standards to ensure the highest quality, timeliness and utility of analytic resources. To achieve this goal, the DDNI for Analysis works to increase expertise and improve analytic tradecraft at individual, agency and community levels through specialization, training, collaboration and cross-fertilization. Some of the most important functions of the DDNI for Analysis include establishing analytic priorities; ensuring timely and effective analysis and dissemination of analysis; tasking of analytic products; and encouraging sound analytic methods, all-source analysis, competitive analysis and resource recommendations regarding the need to balance collection and analytic capabilities.
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is a key component of DNI operations, serving as a bridge between the intelligence and policy communities and as a facilitator of IC collaboration. The NIC supports the DNI in his role as head of the IC and serves as the center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking. Its core missions are to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the IC’s most authoritative written assessments on national security issues, and a broad range of other products; reach out to nongovernmental experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the IC’s perspective; and articulate substantive intelligence priorities and procedures to guide intelligence collection and analysis.
The DNI relies on associate directors who deal with issues cutting across a number of IC functions, and, therefore, reside outside of the directorates. These associate directors include the chief information officer, the civil liberties and privacy officer, the inspector general and the associate director for science and technology.
Mission Managers
Six mission managers serve as the principal IC officials overseeing all aspects of intelligence related to key issues or “targets.” These mission managers oversee Iran, North Korea, Cuba/Venezuela, counter terrorism, counter proliferation, and counterintelligence.
United States Intelligence Community 500 Day Plan
All government contracts that the DNI distributes are classified, making it difficult to determine how much money the office spends. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell reportedly buried a detailed human capital report that detailed the Intelligence Community’s human resourcing and personnel outsourcing trends.
In general, the Intelligence Community reportedly spends 70% of its budgets on private contracts. As a result, intelligence agencies have struggled to retain talent as more government workers leave for the private sector and go back to working for their old agency but at higher costs to the government. In 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden complained that his agency had become a “farm system for contractors,” and officials there banned some companies from the CIA cafeteria for openly recruiting active duty intelligence officers during lunch hour.
Those companies that perform a lot of work for spy agencies include Booz Allen Hamilton, Science Applications International Corp., General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and CACI International. The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity program, DNI’s research and spy tool development unit, has hired Booz Allen Hamilton.
Rent-a-spy (by Patrick Radden Keefe, International Herald Tribune)
The Spy Who Billed Me: Outsourcing the War on Terror (R. J. Hillhouse)
Iran's Nuclear Program
In the summer of 2007, the federal government was preparing to release its intelligence report on Iran, which would include an assessment of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The Bush administration had insisted repeatedly that the Iranian government was determined, and perhaps not far away, from having its first weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The report, what’s known as a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), was prepared by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and its top official for intelligence gathering was determined to make the correct call, unlike with Iraq when US spy efforts incorrectly claimed that country had WMDs.
Instead of declaring that Iran was on the verge of having nuclear weapons, the report stated that it had ceased its weapons program. The conclusion wound up undermining the administration’s hard-line Iran policy. Diplomats and government officials were stunned, as the NIE touched off a political maelstrom with DNI at the center.
DNI to GAO: Don’t Bother Us
In 2006 the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the federal government’s auditor or “watchdog,” issued a report (PDF) urging the Intelligence Community to establish policies for sharing sensitive but unclassified material. The GAO made several recommendations that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) needed to improve information sharing across the government.
The ODNI refused to comment on GAO’s recommendations, claiming it was above the GAO’s authority. “We are aware that you have been previously advised by the Department of Justice that the review of intelligence activities is beyond the GAO’s purview,” read a letter from ODNI to GAO.
DNI Says Talking about US Surveillance will Kill Americans
In August 2007, DNI Michael McConnell granted a rare media interview, in which he said the debate over the warrantless wiretapping by the National Security Agency was dangerous for the country. At one point, a member of the El Paso Times asked: “So you're saying that the reporting and the debate in Congress means that some Americans are going to die?”
McConnell replied, “That's what I mean. Because we have made it so public. We used to do these things very differently, but for whatever reason, you know, it's a democratic process and sunshine's a good thing.”
What’s DNI Trying to Hide?
According to CNET, the DNI’s office was, for a time, using software to hide its web pages from Internet search engines. The spy office was utilizing robot.txt, a program that blocks search engines like Google, MSN and Yahoo from indexing any files at the ODNI web site. Speculation arose that the agency was using the program to either hide potentially embarrassing material that had been posted or modify certain pages, such as transcripts, without people noticing.
Feds use robots.txt files to stay invisible online. Lame.
(by Declan McCullagh, CNET)
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Founded: 2004
Annual Budget: Classified
Employees: Classified
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Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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James R. Clapper, Jr. has extensive experience in intelligence matters, having worked in the field during his four-decade career in the U.S. Air Force and in the administration of President George W. Bush. However, his nomination by President Barack Obama on June 5, 2010, to be Director of National Intelligence was controversial due to Clapper’s aggressive support for outsourcing intelligence work, including prisoner interrogations, to private contractors, and his multiple payroll connections with defense and intelligence contractors. On July 29, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee voted unanimously to approve Clapper's nomination, and he was confirmed by the whole Senate on August 5.
As a young man, Clapper first looked to the U.S. Marine Corps for his career, enlisting briefly in its reserves. But he soon decided to transfer to the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program, which he enrolled in while attending the University of Maryland. Clapper was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force upon graduating in 1963 with a Bachelor’s degree in political science.
From March 1964 to December 1965, he served as the analytic branch chief for the Air Force Special Communications Center at Kelly Air Force Base in Texas. Clapper was then a watch officer and air defense analyst for the 2nd Air Division (later, 7th Air Force) stationed at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in South Vietnam. From December 1966 to June 1970, he was back at Kelly AFB as aide to the commander and command briefer for the Air Force Security Service.
In 1970 Clapper earned a Master of Arts in political science from St. Mary’s University in Texas. It was then off to Thailand, where he commanded Detachment 3 of the 6994th Security Squadron stationed at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base. During his two tours in Southeast Asia, he flew 73 combat support missions over Laos and Cambodia.
In June 1971 Clapper returned to the states to be military assistant to the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), Noel Gayler, at Fort George G. Meade in Maryland. About two years later he became aide to the commander and intelligence staff officer for the Headquarters Air Force Systems Command at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland.
Clapper spent a year studying at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia from August 1974 to September 1975. Then it was on to Hawaii to serve as chief of the signal intelligence branch at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters at Camp H.M. Smith.
He spent another year studying from August 1978 to June 1979, but this time at the National War College at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC.
He then returned to Fort Meade to be the Washington area representative for electronic security command. Clapper’s next assignment at Fort Meade was serving as commander of the 6940th Electronic Security Wing, before returning to Washington as the director for intelligence plans and systems in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence located at Air Force headquarters.
From June 1984 to May 1985, he was commander of the Air Force Technical Applications Center at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.
In time, Clapper served as director of intelligence for three unified commands: U.S. Forces Korea (1985-1987), U.S. Pacific Command (1987-1989) and Strategic Air Command (1989-1990). Also, he served as senior intelligence officer for the Air Force, before taking on his final military post as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from 1992-1995.
After retiring from the service in 1995 as a lieutenant general, he worked as executive director of military intelligence programs for defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. In 1998 he moved on to Intelligence Programs director for SRA International, another government contractor.
On September 13, 2001, he joined the Bush administration as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), which was then known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. He held this position until June 2006. During his tenure, he privatized much of the NGA’s imagery gathering, relying heavily on two companies, DigitalGlobe and GeoEye. Five months after leaving the NGA, Clapper joined the board of directors of GeoEye, where he stayed for five more months…long enough to see GeoEye gain an extra $29.9 million in contracts from the NGA.
In October 2006 Clapper was hired as chief operating officer for DFI Government Services, a national security consulting firm. DFI was soon acquired by Detica which was, in turn, bought out by BAE Systems. Also in October 2006, Clapper joined the board of directors of 3001 International, a prime contractor of the NGA that was acquired by Northup Grumman in September 2008.
Clapper resigned these positions in April 2007, when President George W. Bush nominated him to become under secretary of defense for intelligence. In this role he oversaw the DIA, NGA, the NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office, while working closely with the director of national intelligence. He also held the title of director of defense intelligence, reporting directly to the director of national intelligence as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. In 2007, Clapper told a Senate committee that he supported the use of private contractors to interrogate detainees.
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Blair, Dennis
Previous Director
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Former Navy admiral Dennis Blair is no stranger to controversy, thanks to a career that has included water skiing behind a combat vessel, ignoring orders from civilian officials by offering the Indonesian dictatorship military assistance without authorization to do so during the East Timor crisis, and ignoring his conflict of interest over a billion-dollar warplane program.
Born in Kittery, Maine, on February 4, 1947, Blair was raised in a family that had for five generations served in the US Navy. He attended St. Andrew’s School, and later attended the US Naval Academy, along with Oliver North and James H. Webb (now a US senator). Following his graduation in 1968, he served aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Tattnall.
Blair then received a Rhodes Scholarship that allowed him to attend Oxford University (at the same time Bill Clinton was there), where he received a master’s degree in history and Russian language. He served as a White House Fellow from 1975 to 1976 with Wesley Clark (future Army general) and Marshall Carter (future chairman of the New York Stock Exchange).
During his 34-year naval career, Blair commanded the guided missile destroyer USS Cochrane (which he once tried to water ski behind) and the Kitty Hawk Battle Group. In 1995, Presudent Clinton appointed Blair the Central Intelligence Agency’s first associate director of military support, an assignment that lasted one year. He later served in budget and policy positions on several major Navy staffs, on the National Security Council staff, and as vice admiral and Director of the Joint Staff in the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Blair’s final job in the military was a three-year stint as commander-in-chief of United States Pacific Command, the highest ranking officer over all US forces in the Asia-Pacific region. While serving in this command, Blair reportedly disobeyed orders from the Clinton administration during the 1999 East Timorese crisis. Amid growing violence against the independence movement in Indonesian-occupied East Timor, Blair was ordered to meet with General Wiranto, commander of the Indonesian military, to tell him to shut down the pro-Indonesia militia. The admiral failed to deliver this message during his meeting with Wiranto, and instead gave the Indonesian general an offer of military assistance and a personal invitation to be Blair’s guest in Hawaii. Months later, after killings of independence supporters had grown, Blair was sent back to Indonesia and, following civilian orders, cut off all American ties to the Indonesian military.
Blair was later passed over for chairman of the Joint Chiefs by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who considered him too independent and was wary of his views on engagement in Asia. Blair retired from the Navy in 2002 as a four-star admiral.
As soon as he entered civilian life, Blair became a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a nonprofit largely financed by the federal government to analyze national security issues for the Pentagon. He rose to president and CEO on November 3, 2003,, resigning in 2006 under pressure stemming from his membership on the board of directors of EDO Corporation, a subcontractor for the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter program, and ownership of its stock. A potential conflict of interest was raised after the IDA issued a study that endorsed a three-year contract for the F-22 program. Blair originally chose not to recuse himself from the study because he claimed his seat on the board of directors was not a link of sufficient “scale” to require it. But effective September 11, 2006, he resigned from the EDO board to avoid any “misperceptions.” On November 30, 2006, the Pentagon’s inspector general reported that Blair had violated IDA’s conflict of interest rules but did not influence the result of IDA’s study.
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